# NATO Good/Bad

## Notes

The first wave of the NATO DA is structured as an impact turn file. Additional uniqueness/link cards will be added in the next wave to offer a different way to read the DA.

## NATO Bad

### Generic – 1NC/2NC

#### NATO degrades US security and risks nuclear war – Europe would be better defending itself

Bandow ’15 (Doug Bandow - Bandow holds a JD from Stanford University. He is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. “Should the U.S. Leave NATO?” Cato Institute. 12/7/15. https://www.cato.org/commentary/should-us-leave-nato)

The problem is not just NATO’s recent expansion. An alliance on autopilot ignores changes within existing members. For instance, Turkey is proving to be another area of confrontation that undermines U.S. and European security. Never quite the geopolitical lynch‐​pin that it was made out to be, Ankara spent years prosecuting a brutal campaign against Kurdish separatists and occupied more than one‐​third of the Republic of Cyprus, creating an ethnic Turkish state recognized only by Ankara. Turkey turned in an ever more authoritarian and Islamist direction once President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dropped his early liberalizing pretensions. Ironically, he now appears determined to create a presidency modeled after that of Vladimir Putin. So much for NATO promoting liberal democracy. (That always was a job for the European Union anyway.) Worse, though, is Ankara’s irresponsible shoot‐​down of the Russian plane. Even assuming that Turkey’s claims as to the Russian incursion and Turkish warnings are accurate, 17 seconds over Turkish territory did not warrant such a deadly response. Indeed, Ankara routinely violates the airspace of fellow NATO member Greece. That policy forces cash‐​strapped Athens to waste its limited resources responding. One wonders at the Erdogan government’s reaction if Greece chose to down the Turkish offenders. (NATO is talking about bolstering Turkey’s air defenses against Russia; how about aiding the Greeks against Ankara?) Of course, Turkey knew that Russian forces have no hostile aims—indeed, none of the active combatants, including Syria, are targeting Turkish personnel or materiel. Ankara may have been protecting the illicit oil trade or insurgents in an area dominated by the al‐​Qaeda‐​linked al‐​Nusra Front, or attempting to punish Moscow for backing Syria’s President Bashar al‐​Assad. The first two undermine American interests. The latter might fit with an official aim of Washington, but runs against the more fundamental objective of destroying the Islamic State. None of these potential Turkish goals justifies allowing Ankara to drag NATO into a war with Russia. My Cato Institute colleague Ted Galen Carpenter suggests defenestrating this misbegotten alliance member. Striking is how all of these members, new and old, as well as aspirants—the Baltic States, Georgia and Ukraine, and Turkey—degrade U.S. security. Montenegro, at least, plays the harmless role of the Duchy of Fenwick in the Mouse that Roared. Although its inclusion in the alliance will further antagonize an already paranoid Russia, Podgorica really is irrelevant strategically and militarily. The others are not. In a worst case all of them could ensnare America in a war with a nuclear‐​armed power over modest, indeed, minimal, security stakes. The policy frankly is mad. However, even if Washington’s NATO commitments did not bring far more dangers than benefits, they would be unjustified. Europe could, if it was so inclined, defend itself. Why, 70 years after the conclusion of World War II, 26 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 22 years after creation of the European Union, are the Europeans still dependent on America? Retired Gen. Robert Scales, commandant of the Army War College, recently complained that: “At 30,000, there are fewer American soldiers protecting Western Europe, a piece of the planet that produces 46 percent of global GDP, than there are cops in New York City.” But why can’t an area that accounts for almost half of the world’s production (an overstatement, but never mind) and has a larger population than America provide its own soldiers for defense? Why can’t an area of such economic prowess, which has around eight times the GDP and three times the population of its only possible antagonist, Russia, deploy an armed force capable of deterring any threats? The reason the Europeans don’t do so is because they don’t want to and don’t have to. Some don’t believe that Moscow actually poses much of a threat. Others figure only the nations bordering Russia face any risk, and there’s little interest in “Old Europe” for confronting Moscow over “New Europe.” And almost everyone assumes America will take care of any problems.

#### NATO provokes hostility with Russia – we’re on the brink of another cold war

Jenkins ’18 (Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist, author and BBC broadcaster. “Donald Trump is right. Nato is a costly white elephant.” The Guardian. 7/12/18. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/12/donald-trump-nato-costly-white-elephant-russia)

I regard Trump as an aberration, a temporary trauma afflicting US politics. He honours the thesis of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, that America’s constitution often drives the republic to the abyss, only to drag it back again. But even monsters can ask the occasional good question. Thus Trump this week on Nato, a body so mired in platitude and waffle it has lost sight of its true purpose. Trump wants to know what Europe really regards as its defence policy, for he thinks it takes America for a ride. Nato was founded in 1949 in response to Stalin’s blockade of Berlin. It was meant to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Since then, it has welcomed the American nuclear shield, at vast cost to America. Otherwise, its only military achievements have been the breakup of Yugoslavia and the loss of a squalid 17-year war in Afghanistan. Neither has anything to do with the North Atlantic. Nothing better symbolised this than Theresa May’s bizarre gift to Trump this week of 450 British troops for Kabul. Nato was about deterring an attack on Europe from Russia. In 1945, the west agreed the Potsdam settlement, accepting the Soviets’ “sphere of influence” over eastern Europe. Thus when Russia invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, there was no question of Nato, or Europe, retaliating. The iron curtain was iron. Come 1989 and the collapse of Potsdam Europe, Nato did not approach a broken Russia to agree some new settlement. It did the opposite. To protests from Russia’s weakened leader, Boris Yeltsin, it gathered former Warsaw Pact states under its wing and advanced its border east towards Russia. It embraced Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, then the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. It was like Khrushchev stationing missiles in Cuba. Only Germany counselled caution. Nato’s provocation was so blatant as to be an open invitation to any new populist leader in Moscow to exploit Russia’s bruised patriotism: hence Vladimir Putin. He and his kleptocratic cronies are virtually a Nato creation. But the fact that America was party to the provocation does not invalidate Trump’s question. What is Nato’s policy beyond needling Russia and feebly relying on the American shield? , Europe is almost back to a cold war with Moscow. As winner of the last war, Nato was primarily responsible for lowering tension and making peace. Instead it revelled in victory. If Europe wants to hire an America nuclear shield, it should deal with America over how to pay for it. But the current tit-for-tat hostilities with Russia are playing with fire, and counterproductive. Europe’s land forces are so weak they would be wiped out by Russia in a matter of days. So is Europe really expecting Washington to order a nuclear barrage against Russian “grey area” incursions into the Baltics, let alone a conflict with Orbán’s Hungary or Erdoğan’s Turkey – both Nato members? This is not realistic, any more than was American intervention during Russia’s incursion in Ukraine or Georgia. That is why Orbán and Erdoğan are wisely cosying up to Putin. Nato is adrift of realpolitik. Trump is effectively telling Europe that its Nato is as outdated as the Congress of Vienna by the time of Bismarck. He is wrong to rabbit on about spending 2% or 4% of GDP on weapons. This helps no one but the defence industries – spending should meet plausible threat, not some vague budget target. But no more helpful is Europe’s belligerent posturing towards Moscow, such as Britain’s reaction to the mysterious Wiltshire poisonings. Entrenching Putin behind a siege economy is not a defence policy. Better to go down the route of detente, recognise Russia’s sphere of influence and be just a little nicer to Putin. Whatever Trump’s motives for advocating this, he is surely right. A sensible Nato would have a firefighting force to handle separatist and frontier squabbles such as Kosovo, not a main force conflict with Russia. Attempts to set up a European joint force, of which there have been half a dozen since the 1950s, have been fiascos. Britain and France should end their meaningless nuclear deterrents. Their submarines, aircraft carriers and fighters are costly boys’ toys. At present the only role of conventional forces in Europe has been to yield to American blackmail, to join in Washington’s neo-imperial out-of-area wars, mostly against Islam. Trump used to be against these. Defence planning famously fights the last war but one. Britain’s navy is still fighting the Battle of Jutland and its airforce the Battle of Britain. The money wasted on useless procurement is stupefying. The United Kingdom is perfectly safe from any existential attack: there is no evidence of a Russian design to occupy Britain. Britain needs a decent coastguard, better border security and first-class counter-terrorism. It needs to guard its cyberspace. But its soft power is considerable and its diplomacy respected. When Britain is over its Brexit crisis, defence relations with Europe will need an overhaul. As a first step, it should start thinking the unthinkable about Nato. For that, thank you Trump.

#### NATO causes a moral hazard and deterrence fails – best for the US to leave

Whiton 2018 - Senior Fellow @ the Center for the National Interest   
Christian, "NATO Is Obsolete," Jul 6, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-25167?page=0%2C1

After the alliance was established in 1949, its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, summed up its purpose concisely: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The unofficial mission matched the time well: Western Europe’s postwar future was clouded by the prospect of a Soviet invasion, American insularity, or German militarism—all possible given the preceding decades of history. Nearly seventy years later, none of these concerns still exist. Furthermore, NATO's opposing alliance during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, quit the Soviet Bloc in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself passed into history in 1991—twenty-seven years ago. Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2 percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense. These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion. Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities, knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but end the practice of having over-burdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans' security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.

### Entanglement

#### Members of NATO are susceptible to mutual entanglement – results in incoherent and reckless military strategies

Recchia ’22 (Stefano Recchia holds the John G. Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at SMU. Professor Recchia holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (with distinction) and a master’s in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has been awarded numerous grants and fellowships, including from the Brookings Institution, Fulbright Commission, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. “Protecting civilians or preserving NATO? Alliance entanglement and the Bosnian safe areas.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 3/31/22. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2044315>)

The Bosnian experience in the 1990s gave safe areas for civilian protection a bad name. Several studies have highlighted that from 1993 to 1995, the Bosnian safe areas not only failed to adequately protect civilian populations because of weak enforcement, they also fuelled the ethnic conflict, becoming staging grounds for high-risk military offensives by the supposedly protected party.1 Strikingly, as I show in this article, this potential moral hazard and related challenges were anticipated by United Nations (UN) officials as well as in Western capitals. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1993, the United States, Great Britain, and France backed the safe areas policy at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and issued a much-publicised NATO airpower commitment to ‘deter’ attacks against the areas. They did so notwithstanding the lack of a coherent strategy to protect threatened civilians – let alone end the war. Given the Western powers’ avowed humanitarian instincts, this policy choice not only was reckless but also constitutes an analytical puzzle. I argue that the Western powers’ decision to support safe areas in Bosnia and commit military resources to this ill-fated intervention policy constitutes a case of mutual alliance entanglement. Alliance entanglement occurs when a state’s decision to intervene militarily abroad is determined or significantly influenced by its membership in an alliance. That is, absent the alliance, either the state would prefer not to become involved militarily at all, or it would choose a substantially different intervention policy.2 To date, alliance entanglement has been theorised as a one-way phenomenon. The idea is that one or several allies are involved in a military conflict and pull other allies into that same conflict. According to the classic argument, a state may end up drawn into military conflicts involving its allies, to establish or maintain its reputation as a credible security guarantor.3 More generally, a state may allow itself to be pulled into military conflicts by its allies because of ‘the anticipation of future benefit from the alliance’ – whether in the form of military security, burden sharing, or enhanced diplomatic leverage in other contingencies.4 The possibility that the United States and some of its main allies might pull each other into conflicts besetting non-members, because of alliance pressures, has not been explicitly examined. My argument is that when alliance members at first disagree openly about how to proceed in the face of a security crisis in their neighbourhood, after a period of deadlock, concerns about the alliance’s perceived relevance and effectiveness may push the allies to coalesce around an intervention policy that none of them previously favoured. In such cases, it is appropriate to speak of mutual entanglement, given that the allies pull each other into the resulting military operation. Mutual entanglement, I argue, is especially likely for members of institutionalised alliances, such as NATO, that combine elements of both a traditional defensive alliance and a collective security organisation. Members may value the alliance not just for its mutual security guarantee, but as a symbol of their collective identity, which can be expected to generate strong incentives for consensual problem-solving.5

#### Bosnia Proves

Recchia ’22 (Stefano Recchia holds the John G. Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at SMU. Professor Recchia holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (with distinction) and a master’s in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has been awarded numerous grants and fellowships, including from the Brookings Institution, Fulbright Commission, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. “Protecting civilians or preserving NATO? Alliance entanglement and the Bosnian safe areas.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 3/31/22. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2044315>)

Imagine a situation in which core NATO members, notwithstanding pressures to tackle a security crisis in their neighbourhood, fail for a considerable time to agree on a common policy; indeed, they are at odds to such an extent that they partly undermine each other. This results in significant alliance discord and public recriminations. Eventually, pro-alliance leaders on different sides of the intra-NATO dispute, worried about the alliance’s health, start pushing for a joint military response – motivated to a significant degree by a desire to reinvigorate the alliance and signal unity of purpose both domestically and internationally. After some pulling and hauling, the main alliance members converge around a particular military intervention policy. The alliance – specifically, the value that member states attach to the alliance relationship – will have pulled members toward the intervention. This is not a case of one side in an alliance dragging other members into a military conflict. Instead, the allies have pulled each other toward intervention in a non-member state; they have mutually entangled each other. Using causal process tracing and drawing on declassified US and UK documents, original interviews with senior policymakers, and oral histories, I show that mutual entanglement is precisely what brought about the Western allies’ military commitment to the Bosnian safe areas.6 The principal European powers, on one side, and the United States, on the other, entered 1993 with fundamentally different policy preferences about Bosnia. The Europeans favoured impartial peacekeeping and supported a pragmatic settlement among Bosnia’s main ethnic groups (Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs). By contrast, US president William J. Clinton came to office in early 1993 clearly identifying the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressor and calling for aerial bombing of Serb targets. This resulted in near deadlock among the allies and growing intra-alliance discord that spilled over into public view. The safe areas policy was cobbled together later that year, notwithstanding grave concerns about its effectiveness as a tool for civilian protection, in an effort to patch things up among the allies and demonstrate to the world their unity of purpose. The United States shelved its plans for broader airstrikes and military assistance to the Bosnian Muslims; instead, the allies agreed to support UN-proclaimed safe areas and issued a limited airpower commitment to deter attacks on these areas. I argue that without pressures related to the NATO alliance, the United States and Great Britain, in particular, would have been unlikely to support the safe areas politically and militarily.

#### NATO entangles the US in unnecessary conflicts – each new member magnifies the risk of nuclear war

Carpenter ’22 (Ted Carpenter - Carpenter received his PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas. He is the senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies.” The National Interest. 1/8/22. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-security-dependents-are-not-useful-allies-198953)

TROUBLING PROMISCUITY about acquiring weak U.S. security partners was evident even during the Cold War, and the tendency has become even more pronounced in the post-Cold War era. As the fiasco in Afghanistan (and its ugly predecessor in South Vietnam) confirmed, that problem with U.S. foreign policy has existed in multiple regions. However, the defect has become most acute with respect to Washington’s campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. administrations have worked to add a menagerie of new NATO members, and it has done so with even less selectivity and good judgment than some people use to acquire Facebook friends. Many of those new members have very little to offer to the United States as security partners. Indeed, some are mini-states, bordering on being micro-states. Such lightly armed Lilliputians would add little or nothing to Washington’s own capabilities—especially in a showdown with another major power. As economic assets, their importance is decidedly limited, and militarily, they are even less valuable. It’s hard to see how new NATO allies such as Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia enhance America’s power and security. That point should be apparent based on size of population alone. Albania’s 2.87 million, North Macedonia’s 2.1 million, and Slovenia’s 2.07 million people put those countries squarely in the mini-state category, while Montenegro’s 628,000 barely deserves even that label. It doesn’t get much better with respect to either annual gross domestic product or size of military forces. Even Slovenia’s $52.8 billion GDP puts that country only eighty-sixth in the global rankings. Albania’s $15.2 billion (125th), North Macedonia’s $12.26 billion (135th) and Montenegro’s $4.78 billion (159th) are even less impressive. The military forces that our new NATO allies can field are not likely to strike fear into Russia or any other would-be aggressor. Albania’s armed forces consist of 8,500 active-duty personnel, Slovenia’s consist of 8,500, and North Macedonia has 9,000 available. Montenegro’s active-duty force totals 2,400. In comparison, the Austin, Texas, police department has 2,422 people in its ranks. Granted, the Cold War edition of NATO also had some mini-states as members, most notably Luxembourg and Iceland. However, those members were located within a stable, democratic Western Europe. Their defense also was geographically inseparable from Washington’s mission of protecting important military and economic players, such as West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, from what appeared to be a totalitarian superpower with expansionist ambitions. That situation was qualitatively different from Washington’s gratuitous post-Cold War decision to manage the security of quarrelsome mini-states in the chronically volatile Balkans. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has entangled itself in the region’s parochial spats, but giving some of the countries NATO membership intensified America’s exposure to needless risks and burdens. THE RISK-BENEFIT calculation is even worse with respect to some of the other small nations that have joined NATO in the post-Cold War era. Those partners are not merely irrelevant from the standpoint of U.S. security; they are potentially dangerous tripwires that could trigger a conflict between the United States and a nuclear-armed Russia.

#### Entanglement in the Baltics specifically aggresses Putin

Carpenter ’22 (Ted Carpenter - Carpenter received his PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas. He is the senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies.” The National Interest. 1/8/22. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-security-dependents-are-not-useful-allies-198953)

The United States is flirting with a similar danger today regarding its small clients in Eastern Europe. President George W. Bush’s decision to support the NATO membership bids of the three Baltic republics was—and remains—highly provocative to Russia. One crucial way to reduce the danger of armed clashes between great powers is to show mutual respect for respective spheres of influence. Washington has repeatedly violated that principle by pushing NATO to expand right up to Russia’s border. The addition of the Baltic republics in 2004 was the most dangerous step in that process. As in the case of the subsequent addition of the small Balkan nations to NATO, the three Baltic countries have little to offer in terms of military capabilities. Estonia’s 6,700 troops, Latvia’s 5,500, and even Lithuania’s 20,500 wouldn’t be much of a factor if war broke out between NATO and Russia. However, the drawbacks of making the Baltic republics U.S. security dependents go far beyond their irrelevance as military players. Those three countries were once part of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, and substantial ethnic Russian minorities still live in both Estonia and Latvia. The Kremlin has complained on numerous occasions since the Baltic republics became independent at the end of 1991 that the Russian population suffers discrimination and other mistreatment. Indeed, that allegation emerged long before Russian president Vladimir Putin became Russia’s leader. Relations between the Kremlin and its former territories remain tense because of that issue. Perhaps even more troubling, Washington’s Baltic allies now are feuding with Moscow’s principal client in the region, Belarus. In the summer and autumn of 2021, Latvia and Lithuania (along with the European Union) accused Belarus of trying to use a flood of Middle East refugees as a form of “hybrid warfare.” The Lithuanian government even told its border guards to use force if necessary to prevent the continued entry of the migrants. A short time later, Latvia imposed a state of emergency to deal with the same issue. A few weeks earlier, Lithuania had augmented its border barrier by erecting a fence with razor wire. Latvia soon followed suit. A new round of large-scale, Russia-Belarus military exercises (held every four years) in September made tensions even more acute. By virtue of both size and location, the Baltic republics are not credible strategic assets for the United States. Indeed, they would be virtually helpless if Russia made a military move against them. A 2016 RAND Corporation study concluded that a Russian offensive would overrun their defenses in approximately three days. Such countries are not U.S. “allies” in any meaningful sense; they are vulnerable dependents that could trigger a war between NATO (primarily the United States) and Russia. Washington’s patron-client relationship with the Baltic republics is risky, and U.S. leaders were unwise to push for their inclusion in NATO. However, beginning with George W. Bush’s administration, officials have engaged in even more reckless conduct regarding possible alliance membership for two other countries, Georgia and Ukraine. They have done so despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin that making either country (especially Ukraine) a NATO member would cross a red line that Moscow cannot tolerate.

#### Entanglement gives Putin a justification to escalate the war

Toosi ’22 (Nahal Toosi - POLITICO's senior correspondent for foreign affairs and national security. “White House sweats over its growing entanglement in Ukraine.” Politico. 3/9/22. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/09/biden-russia-ukraine-arms-00015518)

Much of what Putin or his aides have said in recent days “is posturing to try to keep countries from being more actively engaged, especially countries geographically closer to Russia,” the senior administration official added. That’s likely the case for a country like Poland. Poland’s desire to hand the jets to the U.S. suggested that it is worried about how Russia would respond were it to give the planes to Ukraine directly, said Scott Anderson, a former State Department attorney who specializes in national security. Russia is unlikely to attack Poland — it is, after all, a member of NATO, and an attack would trigger a response from all of NATO, including the U.S. But Russia could use other means to retaliate, including economic measures or cyberattacks, Anderson said. The idea of giving Ukraine the jets could be argued by the U.S. or its allies as not being much different than giving Kyiv additional weapons, some analysts said, even though fighter jets are more likely to capture the popular imagination. But the mode of transfer can matter. If the Ukrainians fly the jets into their country from a Polish or American base and clash with Russian forces along the way, that could escalate the crisis, as Kirby suggested. Russia may even have some right to argue that Poland or the U.S. — or Germany, perhaps, since that’s where one base under discussion is located — has directly participated in the war by offering a staging ground for the jets.

#### Even if NATO does not directly respond to escalation from Putin with nuclear war, triumphant Putinism spurs nuclear aggression from China, North Korea, and Iran that would draw NATO in

Rosen ’22 (Stephen Peter Rosen is the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University. “If Putin Were to Use Nuclear Weapons, What Would Follow?” The BullWark. 3/23/22. https://www.thebulwark.com/if-putin-were-to-use-nuclear-weapons-what-would-follow/)

Yesterday, Kremlin and White House officials answered questions about what might happen if Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine goes nuclear. When asked by CNN’s Christiane Amanpour about the conditions under which Putin would order the use of nuclear weapons, Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov replied, “if it is an existential threat for our country, then it can be.” This quickly led to speculation about whether Putin might consider a threat to the continuation of his regime as sufficiently “existential” to warrant the use of nuclear weapons. In White House press briefing room yesterday, a reporter asked National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan whether President Joe Biden would discuss with other NATO leaders the possible use by Russia of nuclear weapons. “Well, President Putin, in the early days of the conflict, actually raised the specter of the potential use of nuclear weapons,” Sullivan replied. “We are constantly monitoring for that potential contingency. And of course, we take it as seriously as one could possibly take it.” Biden likely would be discussing “potential responses” with NATO leaders, Sullivan said. So far, President Biden has chosen to proceed calmly. On March 11, he warned that “Russia would pay a severe price” if chemical weapons were used in Ukraine but remained silent about nuclear weapons (although senior administration spokesmen acknowledged that possible Russian nuclear use was being closely watched). Any military preparations, if there are any, were not announced. The strategy was to ignore the nuclear threat as if it had not been made. This may have been the wisest course, but it may have had the effect of further convincing Putin that he has to do something that cannot be ignored. This week, Biden intensified his rhetoric, saying that Putin’s “back is against the wall” and that Russian propaganda about Ukraine supposedly having biological and chemical weapons is “a clear sign he is considering using both of those.” He reiterated the unspecific threat of “severe consequences.” Earlier this month I wrote in The Bulwark that as the war goes worse for Putin his incentives for using nuclear weapons go up. Well, the war is going worse for him. If Putin were to use chemical weapons, he would test NATO resolve. NATO may be able to deter Russian nuclear weapons use by mounting a fierce and violent response to Russian chemical weapons use. It should prepare to do so. What if NATO responds with more sanctions but not military intervention, and Putin raises the stakes again? Some commentators appear to assume that NATO at that point would have to back down, however tragic that might be, to avoid a nuclear war. It may be the case that any NATO action that could increase the risk of nuclear war is unacceptable. That is what Putin is counting on. A small risk of a nuclear war that kills millions may well be unacceptable to us and our allies. We may decide it is, but we should do so with an understanding of what will follow. Putin and Putinism will be understood to be victorious. If one nuclear-armed nation can commit clear acts of international aggression against a non-nuclear nation and then shut down military responses by using nuclear weapons in a limited manner, other nations with aggression in mind will surely take note. Chinese nuclear coercion would become part of any plan against Taiwan. North Korean nuclear coercion would be revived. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Iranian nuclear coercion of Saudi Arabia, though not of Israel, would become a real possibility. NATO would need to deploy nuclear weapons to the Baltic states to defend them. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan after the invasion of Ukraine. After a Russian victory, the Japanese government might ask for such deployments. In which case, China would be furious. Other countries on the fence about getting their own nuclear weapons will decide that they must. The point is that taking action against Putin even though he uses nuclear weapons has risks, but not taking action also has risks. They are just a little bit further down the road.

#### Nuclear war would be catastrophic and collapse human civilization

Lynas ’22 (Mark Lynas - He has written for numerous publications, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian and CNN.com. “What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and Russia?.” Alliance for Science. 3/10/22. https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2022/03/what-the-science-says-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/)

Russian leader Vladimir Putin has suggested that he would consider using nuclear weapons if confronted with a NATO military response in Ukraine, or if faced with a direct threat to his person or regime. If the war spreads to a NATO country like Estonia or Poland a direct US-Russia confrontation would take place, with a clear danger of runaway nuclear escalation. The world is therefore arguably now closer to nuclear conflict than at any time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. So what would a full-scale nuclear exchange look like in reality? Is it truly global Armageddon, or would it be survivable for some people and places? Many scientists have investigated this question already. Their work is surprisingly little known, likely because in peacetime no one wants to think the unthinkable. But we are no longer in peacetime and the shadows of multiple mushroom clouds are looming once again over our planet. Current nuclear weapons inventories The latest assessment of Russian nuclear military capability estimates that as of early 2022 Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,477 nuclear warheads — nearly 6,000 if “retired” warheads are included. The US maintains a similar inventory of 5,500 warheads, with 3,800 of those rapidly deployable. The explosive power of these weapons is difficult to comprehend. It has been estimated that about 3 million tons (megatons or Mt) of TNT equivalent were detonated in World War II. For comparison, each of the UK’s Trident submarines carries 4 megatons of TNT equivalent on 40 nuclear warheads, meaning each submarine can cause more explosive destruction than took place during the entirety of World War II. Hiroshima and Nagasaki In 1945 the US attacked the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, giving us two real-world examples of the effects of nuclear weapons on human populations. A total of 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 73,000 in Nagasaki died instantaneously or within five months due to the nuclear blast, intense radiant heat from the fireball and ionizing radiation. Many people caught within 1km of ground zero were carbonized by heat rays, and those up to 1.5km away suffered flash burning with large areas of skin later peeling off. Some, especially those inside buildings, were reduced to white bones as all flesh was vaporized by the intense heat. Many survivors, later to become known as hibakusha in Japanese, suffered acute radiation sickness (ARS) from neutron and gamma rays released by nuclear fission in the blasts. Symptoms included bloody diarrhea, hair loss, fever and intense thirst. Many later died. As well as direct radiation from the fireballs they were also exposed to radioactive fallout from the bomb. The longer-term effects of radiation experienced by the hibakusha have been intensively studied, and include increased levels of leukemia and solid cancers. However, experiencing an atomic bombing was not an automatic death sentence: among the 100,000 or so survivors the excess rates of cancer over the subsequent years were about 850, and leukemia less than 100. Hiroshima and Nagasaki show that — apart from short-term ARS — long-term radiation from fallout will be the least of our problems following a nuclear war. Much more serious will be social collapse, famine and the breakdown of much of the planetary biosphere. ‘Limited’ nuclear conflict – 100 warheads between India and Pakistan Prior to the Ukraine war it seemed very unlikely that the superpowers would confront each other again, so many researchers turned to studying the impacts of more limited nuclear conflicts. One study published two years ago looked at the likely impacts of a nuclear exchange of about 100 Hiroshima-sized detonations (15 kt yield each) on the most-populated urban areas of India and Pakistan. Each detonation was estimated to incinerate an area of 13 square km, with this scenario generating about 5 Tg (teragrams) of soot as smoke from wildfires and burning buildings entered the atmosphere. Direct human deaths in this “limited” nuclear war scenario are not quantified in the study, but would presumably number in the tens to hundreds of millions. The planetary impacts are also severe: as the soot reaches the stratosphere it circulates globally, blocking incoming solar radiation and dropping the Earth’s surface temperature by 1.8C in the first five years. This would be a greater cooling than caused by any recent volcanic eruption, and more than any climate perturbation for at least the last 1,000 years. Rainfall patterns are drastically altered, and total precipitation declines by about 8 percent. (These results come from widely-used climate models of the same types used to project long-term impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.) Food exports collapse as stocks are depleted within a single year, and by year four a total of 1.3 billion people face a loss of about a fifth of their current food supply. The researchers conclude that “a regional conflict using <1 percent of the worldwide nuclear arsenal could have adverse consequences for global food security unmatched in modern history.” A 2014 study of the same scenario (of a 100-weapon nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan) found that the soot penetrating the stratosphere would cause severe damage to the Earth’s ozone layer, increasing UV penetration by 30-80 percent over the mid-latitudes. This would cause “widespread damage to human health, agriculture, and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems,” the researchers wrote. “The combined cooling and enhanced UV would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine.” If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia? One 2008 study looked at a Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100 weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories held each by Russia and the US. Nuclear weapons held by other states were not used in this scenario, which has a 440-Mt explosive yield, equivalent to about 150 times all the bombs detonated in World War II. This full-scale nuclear war was estimated to cause 770 million direct deaths and generate 180 Tg of soot from burning cities and forests. In the US, about half the population would be within 5km of a ground zero, and a fifth of the country’s citizens would be killed outright. A subsequent study, published in 2019, looked at a comparable but slightly lower 150 Tg atmospheric soot injection following an equivalent scale nuclear war. The devastation causes so much smoke that only 30-40 percent of sunlight reaches the Earth’s surface for the subsequent six months. A massive drop in temperature follows, with the weather staying below freezing throughout the subsequent Northern Hemisphere summer. In Iowa, for example, the model shows temperatures staying below 0°C for 730 days straight. There is no growing season. This is a true nuclear winter. Nor is it just a short blip. Temperatures still drop below freezing in summer for several years thereafter, and global precipitation falls by half by years three and four. It takes over a decade for anything like climatic normality to return to the planet. By this time, most of Earth’s human population will be long dead. The world’s food production would crash by more than 90 percent, causing global famine that would kill billions by starvation. In most countries less than a quarter of the population survives by the end of year two in this scenario. Global fish stocks are decimated and the ozone layer collapses. The models are eerily specific. In the 4,400 warhead/150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario, averaged over the subsequent five years, China sees a reduction in food calories of 97.2 percent, France by 97.5 percent, Russia by 99.7 percent, the UK by 99.5 percent and the US by 98.9 percent. In all these countries, virtually everyone who survived the initial blasts would subsequently starve. Human extinction? Even the 150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario is orders of magnitude less than the amount of smoke and other particulates put into the atmosphere by the asteroid that hit the Earth at the end of the Cretaceous, 65 million years ago, killing the dinosaurs and about two-thirds of species alive at the time. This implies that some humans would survive, eventually to repopulate the planet, and that a species-level extinction of Homo sapiens is unlikely even after a full-scale nuclear war. But the vast majority of the human population would suffer extremely unpleasant deaths from burns, radiation and starvation, and human civilization would likely collapse entirely. Survivors would eke out a living on a devastated, barren planet.

### EU Defense Integration

#### NATO prevents successful EU defense innovation – creates an unrealistic model and promotes divisiveness

Coffey ’13 (Luke Coffey - Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy. He received a master of science degree in the politics and government of the European Union from the London School of Economics. “EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Europe’s Security.” The Heritage Foundation. 6/6/13. https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/eu-defense-integration-undermining-nato-transatlantic-relations-and-europes-security)

The CSDP Is Duplicative and Discriminatory Toward NATO Proponents of EU defense integration argue that military capabilities developed under the auspices of the CSDP will always be made available to NATO. For example, an EU Battlegroup could also be on call for NATO operations if, and when, NATO was ever to request the use of it. This may sound good in theory but is unlikely to work in practice. This is due to the institutional workings of the EU and the composition of its membership. Any time that EU military assets are used, unanimous agreement by all EU members is required. Six veto-wielding EU members are not members of NATO. Of these six countries, five are established neutral countries: Ireland, Austria, Malta, Sweden, and Finland. The other, Cyprus, is politically hostile toward NATO member Turkey and has a track record of blocking NATO-EU cooperation in the past. The most recent example of EU duplication of NATO capabilities is the push for the creation of a permanent EU operational headquarters (OHQ). An EU OHQ is a needless and expensive proposal that is more about planting the EU flag than it is about increasing Europe’s military capability. The EU already has access to the full range of NATO’s military headquarters at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) under the Berlin-Plus arrangement.[37] Furthermore, the EU has access to five national headquarters for use for EU-led military missions.[38] The estimated cost of establishing an EU military operational headquarters is tens of millions of dollars. At a time when NATO is decreasing the number of its regional headquarters to save money, it hardly makes sense for the EU to be increasing its own numbers. Although a number of EU countries have called for the creation of the OHQ, the British have so far been successful in blocking it. British Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters in July 2011 that I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree to such a permanent OHQ. We will not agree to it now, we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line for us. We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning. [39] The CSDP is also discriminatory against non-EU NATO members. Perhaps the best example is with Turkey. Although Turkey can be a challenging partner for the U.S. and NATO, it is a valuable partner nevertheless. Turkey played a key role in NATO during the Cold War by being one of two NATO members that bordered the Soviet Union. Turkey’s military contribution to international security operations sets it apart from many of the nations of Western Europe. The Turks have deployed thousands of troops to Afghanistan. In addition, they have commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) twice since 2002. The Turks have also contributed to a number of peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, and participated in the American-led Combined Task Force-151 in the Gulf of Aden to help combat piracy and terrorism in the region. The source of this discriminatory attitude towards Turkey is the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey. In addition, many in the EU no longer want to give Turkey what it was promised in the late 1980s: eventual EU membership. This has created an atmosphere of animosity and distrust between the EU and Turkey. These two points combined have caused serious problems for NATO and EU relations: The technical agreement between NATO’s KFOR military-led mission in Kosovo and the EU’s civilian Rule of Law mission was delayed for years; The technical agreement between NATO’s ISAF military-led mission in Afghanistan and the EU’s EUPOL civilian policing mission still has not been finalized; and In 2002 and 2003, this dispute led to the delayed takeover of NATO’s Operation Amber Fox in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) by the EU. Cyprus’s unwillingness to cooperate with Turkey has been blamed for putting lives at risk in places like Afghanistan. In 2011, a report published by the House of Lords on the EU’s police training mission in Afghanistan stated: We still believe that the lack of a formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel has increased the risk to the lives of EUPOL personnel, including British citizens. This is unacceptable.… Only the Taliban benefit from the lack of such an agreement. [40]

#### US defense spending in NATO deters European defense development – no incentive to contribute

NATO ’22 (“Funding NATO.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4/1/22. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_67655.htm)

When the North Atlantic Council (NAC) – NATO’s top political decision-making body –unanimously decides to engage in an operation or mission, there is no obligation for each and every member to contribute unless it is an Article 5 collective defence operation, in which case expectations are different. In all cases, NATO (as an organisation) does not have its own armed forces, so Allies commit troops and equipment. Contributions vary in form and scale from, for instance, a few soldiers to thousands of troops, and from armoured vehicles, naval vessels or helicopters to all forms of equipment or support, medical or other. These contributions are offered by individual Allies and are taken from their overall defence capability to form a combined Alliance capability, with each covering the costs associated with their deployments. In 2006, NATO Defence Ministers agreed to commit a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence spending to continue to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness. This guideline also serves as an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to NATO’s common defence efforts since the defence capacity of each member has an impact on the overall perception of the Alliance’s credibility as a politico-military organisation. The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, measured in GDP, is almost equal to that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence. This imbalance has been a constant, with variations, throughout the history of the Alliance and more so since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, after which the United States significantly increased its defence spending. The volume of US defence expenditure represents approximately two thirds of the defence spending of the Alliance as a whole. However, this is not the amount the United States contributes to the operational running of NATO, which is shared with all Allies according to the principle of common funding. Moreover, US defence spending also covers commitments outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the Alliance relies on the United States for the provision of some essential capabilities, regarding for instance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.

#### NATO operates against European interests – prevents independence and defense integration

Shuo ’22 (Wang Shuo - The author is a professor at the School of International Relations of Beijing Foreign Studies University. “Only a united Europe can break NATO’s control, gain autonomy.” Global Times. 4/5/22. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1257566.shtml)

Monday marked the 73rd anniversary of the founding of NATO. This US-led bloc's repeated eastward expansion squeezed Russia's strategic space, which triggered Russia to launch a military operation toward Ukraine. Europe has been then dragged into plight. In seven decades, what has NATO brought to Europe? For Europe, NATO has been a double-edged sword. Since the Cold War, NATO has provided Europe with security protection. But it has also created problems for the continent, such as a decline of its independence and the restriction of European integration. Europe hopes NATO can play the role of a shield, while under the leadership of the US, NATO actually acts as a spear, an offensive tool for the US to maintain its regional and global hegemony. NATO wants to achieve its security through eastward expansion, but it has made Europe increasingly insecure. And many security problems encountered by Europe were created by the US. For example, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict was actually provoked by Washington. Europe's decades-long reliance on NATO for security has also resulted in a decline in its member states' defense capabilities. In exchange for US security protection, Europe has to compromise with the US on non-security issues, such as coordinating with Washington in exploiting NATO to interfere in the affairs of other countries or regions to safeguard US hegemony. Against this backdrop, many of their joint operations within NATO go against Europe's interests. Europe's dependence on NATO is like taking painkillers. If Europe does not take such medicine, it will suffer from pains. But by taking painkillers, Europe will suffer more from the reliance or addiction to the medicine. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Saturday, "When the Europeans will sober up a little from the American bourbon, when they will finally realize that we must together care about the fates of our continent, of Europe, even Eurasia, then the time will come finally to reassess our relations and to enter the state of dialogue," according to Tass. Peskov's line sounds very rational. Europe's mentality toward the US and NATO has always been contradictory. Europe's interests and strategic demands are different from those of Washington. If Europe blindly follows the US, it will not be in line with Europe's interests. Furthermore, whether it is the financial crisis or the Ukrainian crisis, it is the interest groups of the US that benefit in the end, including capital giants, military-industrial complexes and energy giants. Those suffering the loss have always been Europeans, who have to face problems such as soaring prices. Within Europe, there are two schools, one pro-Atlantic and the other advocating strategic independence. Since US President Joe Biden took office, voices calling for strategic independence have become weaker. But the Russia-Ukraine crisis has made many Europeans realize that Biden is not much different from his predecessor Donald Trump - the one that suffers is Europe, as always. It is believed the crisis could awaken the Europeans. They should hold no illusion about the US and have a sense of urgency that security and peace are not granted but something they must fight for. On March 21, the European Council formally approved the Strategic Compass, giving the EU an ambitious plan of action for strengthening its security and defense policy by 2030. The plan includes establishing a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops for different types of crises. This plan is symbolic. Europe does not have enough ability to maintain its own security. Different member states have different military strengths. The ability of small- and medium-sized European countries in terms of military, supply, intelligence and command is limited. But at least, this plan is positive since it shows Europe has started to strive for independence and to seek peace and security with its own strength, despite the long road ahead.

#### EU defense integration is key to deterring Russia – it’s try or die – NATO deterrence failing now

Braw ’22 (Elisabeth Braw - a columnist at Foreign Policy and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “To Deter Russia, Europe Needs More Military Integration.” *FP.* 2/9/22. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/09/to-deter-russia-europe-needs-more-military-integration/)

If Russian leader Vladimir Putin backs down from the Ukrainian border this time, European countries can thank their lucky star—Washington. In their current setup, they are hardly able to deter Russia. That, of course, is the reason Macron and others argue that a “true European army” is indispensable. But as de Jong and his troops—and indeed European politicians and other officers—know, military integration isn’t easy. Europe’s best efforts to date are otherwise the never-deployed EU Battlegroups and the Eurocorps, which functions as the EU Battlegroup headquarters. The Netherlands and Belgium form a joint navy, whose vessels patrol various waters. That’s no mean feat, but it’s hardly as complicated as having soldiers of two nationalities permanently serving alongside one another. The integration hasn’t been perfect. Indeed, for its first deployment the 414 Tank Battalion had to borrow equipment from other Dutch and German units, and the 1st Panzer Division is likely to need another couple of years before it’s fully combat-ready with its own equipment. But when the 414th returns on its next rotation, it will be commanded by a Dutch officer. What’s more, the two allies are in the process of integrating the Dutch Army’s two other combat brigades into Germany’s Bundeswehr. The Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade has already been made part of the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Forces Division; like the fully integrated 43rd Mechanized, it’s even listed on the Rapid Forces’ list of units. Pending approval by the new governments in Berlin and The Hague, the Dutch Army’s 13th Light Brigade will also be integrated into the Bundeswehr: an army’s whole combat capability, integrated into another country’s army. Logistically, it’s a staggering achievement—and politically, too, considering that a mere 82 years ago the Netherlands was occupied by Nazi Germany. At the moment, the two armies are even writing a joint Common Army Vision. “The German and Dutch armies are constantly in contact with each other to discuss further cooperation, which they do through a formal entity called Army Steering Group,” a spokesman for the German Army told me. Such integration requires enormous trust. “The Dutch-German integration is quite unique; it is nearly without caveats and works very well,” noted Bart Groothuis, a Dutch defense expert and member of the European Parliament for the Dutch center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. “But if there were to be a crisis in the Baltics, would we, for example, have the logistics to resupply it? The answer is no. So why are we then so happy about it?” To be sure, the 1st Panzer Division won’t be supplanting U.S. forces in Europe anytime soon: U.S. European Command has more than 60,000 military and civilian personnel, not to mention superb equipment stored in various European countries. And when crises loom, Washington can send more. On Feb. 6, 1,700 members of the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Poland from Fort Bragg. To have reached the 1st Panzer Division’s level of integration is, however, a remarkable achievement for any two countries. Building trust (not to mention overcoming language barriers) are just one part of the challenge. “There also has to be the military and political will to make it happen,” de Jong noted. “If politicians are only interested in a picture in a newspaper, the whole thing will fall apart.” Of course, the whole thing will equally fall apart of the countries disagree on when it should be used. If Germany had wanted to send the 414 Tank Battalion to Lithuania and the Netherlands had refused, it would have been useless. The unit’s deployment, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu told me, “is a strong display of Germany’s and the Netherlands’ commitment and capabilities. At a time of unprecedented security challenges, the ability of allies to act together quickly and effectively remains essential.” Thanks to the Bundeswehr, the Dutch Army has maximized its striking and rapid-forces capabilities at minimal expense. The Bundeswehr has, of course, gained new soldiers and officers. And both sides share equipment that would otherwise have to be duplicated. Indeed, interoperability and cultural hurdles notwithstanding, integrating one’s armed forces with those of a neighbor seems commonsense. With such integration, Europe’s various armed forces could turn into a mighty force, one capable of looking after the continent and any deserving neighbors. Imagine what fully integrated European armed forces would be able to do now that Russia is flexing its muscles. Finland and Sweden are, in fact, working hard to combine, for example, defense planning and use of airfields. But integration has the most potential if it involves a larger and a smaller country. Germany is, in fact, working to replicate the 1st Panzer Division success. And perhaps Macron should start small by having France team up with Belgium? Indeed, other European armed services could simply visit the 1st Panzer Division to find out what’s involved. “The Dutch-German cooperation could demonstrate to other European NATO member states how to establish deployable multinational units,” the German Army spokesman told me. “Our allies could use the Dutch-German experiences to identify approaches that they themselves could use. That would help European armed forces to increasingly establish large joint units for the defense of Europe.” There must be massive interest in your unit, I told de Jong. “Yes,” he said, “but people never say, ‘We’ll do the same.’” Virtually no countries are as close and similar as Germany and the Netherlands, but even close friends Sweden and Finland haven’t dared venture into full-fledged integration. I asked de Jong what his advice would be to other countries. “Don’t start with integration,” he replied. “Start with proper cooperation!”

#### Russian escalation would be catastrophic – global nuclear coercion and NATO draw in

\*Same card from Entanglement scenario – different tag

Rosen ’22 (Stephen Peter Rosen is the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University. “If Putin Were to Use Nuclear Weapons, What Would Follow?” The BullWark. 3/23/22. https://www.thebulwark.com/if-putin-were-to-use-nuclear-weapons-what-would-follow/)

Yesterday, Kremlin and White House officials answered questions about what might happen if Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine goes nuclear. When asked by CNN’s Christiane Amanpour about the conditions under which Putin would order the use of nuclear weapons, Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov replied, “if it is an existential threat for our country, then it can be.” This quickly led to speculation about whether Putin might consider a threat to the continuation of his regime as sufficiently “existential” to warrant the use of nuclear weapons. In White House press briefing room yesterday, a reporter asked National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan whether President Joe Biden would discuss with other NATO leaders the possible use by Russia of nuclear weapons. “Well, President Putin, in the early days of the conflict, actually raised the specter of the potential use of nuclear weapons,” Sullivan replied. “We are constantly monitoring for that potential contingency. And of course, we take it as seriously as one could possibly take it.” Biden likely would be discussing “potential responses” with NATO leaders, Sullivan said. So far, President Biden has chosen to proceed calmly. On March 11, he warned that “Russia would pay a severe price” if chemical weapons were used in Ukraine but remained silent about nuclear weapons (although senior administration spokesmen acknowledged that possible Russian nuclear use was being closely watched). Any military preparations, if there are any, were not announced. The strategy was to ignore the nuclear threat as if it had not been made. This may have been the wisest course, but it may have had the effect of further convincing Putin that he has to do something that cannot be ignored. This week, Biden intensified his rhetoric, saying that Putin’s “back is against the wall” and that Russian propaganda about Ukraine supposedly having biological and chemical weapons is “a clear sign he is considering using both of those.” He reiterated the unspecific threat of “severe consequences.” Earlier this month I wrote in The Bulwark that as the war goes worse for Putin his incentives for using nuclear weapons go up. Well, the war is going worse for him. If Putin were to use chemical weapons, he would test NATO resolve. NATO may be able to deter Russian nuclear weapons use by mounting a fierce and violent response to Russian chemical weapons use. It should prepare to do so. What if NATO responds with more sanctions but not military intervention, and Putin raises the stakes again? Some commentators appear to assume that NATO at that point would have to back down, however tragic that might be, to avoid a nuclear war. It may be the case that any NATO action that could increase the risk of nuclear war is unacceptable. That is what Putin is counting on. A small risk of a nuclear war that kills millions may well be unacceptable to us and our allies. We may decide it is, but we should do so with an understanding of what will follow. Putin and Putinism will be understood to be victorious. If one nuclear-armed nation can commit clear acts of international aggression against a non-nuclear nation and then shut down military responses by using nuclear weapons in a limited manner, other nations with aggression in mind will surely take note. Chinese nuclear coercion would become part of any plan against Taiwan. North Korean nuclear coercion would be revived. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Iranian nuclear coercion of Saudi Arabia, though not of Israel, would become a real possibility. NATO would need to deploy nuclear weapons to the Baltic states to defend them. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan after the invasion of Ukraine. After a Russian victory, the Japanese government might ask for such deployments. In which case, China would be furious. Other countries on the fence about getting their own nuclear weapons will decide that they must. The point is that taking action against Putin even though he uses nuclear weapons has risks, but not taking action also has risks. They are just a little bit further down the road.

#### The EU needs to oversee post-war reconstruction – NATO stands in the way

Cox ’22 (Robert Cox – Studied at Cambridge University and the College of Europe. He was appointed Head of the EC Mission in Turkey. “Europe at War.” American Diplomacy. 5/1/22. https://media.proquest.com/media/hms/PFT/1/de7jM?\_s=B3mL6jfZivoZn1BdpVpz9X08Gw8%3D)

Mastering the Future: We want to assume that Russia will lose this war—albeit at what cost to all concerned? Whatever happens, the European Union will have to assume leadership in promoting a wider new security order in Europe while repairing the war damage, physical and political. A damaged Russia—if that is the outcome of today’s conflict—must not be left to sulk in its fastnesses, waiting for a chance for revenge. Further NATO expansion is not the answer. A reformulation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation & Security in Europe (OSCE) might offer a framework for a buffer-zone of security, including Russia’s western military districts. The EU has no longer any excuse to delegate its security to a reluctant Washington, tired of more involvement in Europe anyhow. Political and economic reconstruction in the east is the EU’s responsibility. The EU did it with some success after 1990; the experience gained and instruments (such as the Bank for European Reconstruction and Development —BERD) are still there. Talented young Russians, now fleeing the country, and essential for its rehabilitation, must be encouraged to return home. As will Ukrainian refugees. This is not to exclude the US. EU and US officials are reportedly looking at erecting a transatlantic dialogue on Russia aimed at “giving a more permanent structure to the flurry of contacts that have taken place since the war in Ukraine” (Financial Times, March 30, 2202).

### Ukraine/Russia War

#### NATO security cooperation prolongs the war in Ukraine

Carpenter ’22 (Ted Carpenter - Carpenter received his PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas. He is the senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. “If We Don’t Want Nuclear War, Why Are We Pushing for One?” Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/commentary/we-dont-want-nuclear-war-why-are-we-pushing-one)

The principal features of the U.S. and NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are now readily apparent. In addition to the U.S.-led effort to orchestrate a campaign of global economic warfare to isolate and punish Russia, Washington and its allies have adopted a policy of showering Kyiv with sophisticated weapons to boost the effectiveness of the country’s military resistance. Proposals also keep surfacing to provide Ukraine with more capable jet fighters. In addition to the weaponry, the United States and other NATO members are actively sharing military intelligence with Ukraine. The first component of the West’s strategy has enjoyed only limited effectiveness, but the second one has achieved considerable success. Russia has discovered that its “special military operation” in Ukraine has gone much slower and come at a substantially greater cost in both materiel and lives than the Kremlin anticipated. This development has encouraged optimistic hawks throughout the West to advocate an even more vigorous military assistance program under the assumption that Ukraine actually might be able to win the war against its much larger, stronger neighbor. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R‑SC) contends that “a loss for Putin is possible if the freedom‐​loving world goes all‐​in for victory.” Among other steps, in his view, “all‐​in means providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with additional lethal aid and capabilities.” It is a faulty and potentially very dangerous belief that could well bring about a nuclear war. Moscow’s principal objectives in Ukraine are straightforward and uncompromising: compelling Kyiv to relinquish its ambitions to join NATO and instead embrace legally binding neutrality, gaining Ukrainian recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, and forcing Ukraine to accept the Russian supervised “independence” of the secessionist Donbas republics. If Russian President Vladimir Putin and other members of the country’s political and military elite conclude that the war in Ukraine is failing and that Moscow will not achieve those objectives, the Kremlin’s response is likely to be very unpleasant for all concerned. A cornered Putin administration would have a powerful incentive to escalate the conflict by using tactical nuclear weapons against military and political targets in Ukraine. A few Western officials, including CIA Director William J. Burns, seem aware of the potential danger. In his response to a question from former Senator Sam Nunn (D‑GA) on April 14, Burns warned that “potential desperation” to extract the semblance of a victory in Ukraine could tempt Putin to order the use of a tactical or low‐​yield nuclear weapon. Such weapons are much smaller than the “city‐​buster,” multi‐​megaton monsters that both superpowers tested during the Cold War and still remain in the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, the destructive effects of detonating even tactical or low‐​yield nuclear weapons would be sizable, and the symbolic importance of crossing the nuclear threshold would be monumental. It is extremely reckless to pursue measures that increase the likelihood of such a scenario. Yet the policies that the United States and other NATO governments are adopting (frequently prodded by elements of foreign policy establishment and the so‐​called mainstream news media) create precisely that danger. Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, contends blithely that warnings from Putin about using nuclear weapons in response to mounting Western military assistance to Kyiv should be ignored. “The threat of escalation is cheap talk,” McFaul states confidently. “Putin is bluffing.”

#### Article 5 risks widening the war in Ukraine

Giltner ’22 (Benjamin Giltner - Benjamin Giltner is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities and a first-year graduate student at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. “Washington’s entanglement with allies makes the Ukraine war much more dangerous.” The Orange County Register. 4/6/22. <https://www.ocregister.com/2022/04/06/washingtons-entanglement-with-allies-makes-the-ukraine-war-much-more-dangerous/>)

A debate has emerged about whether the U.S. should implement a “no-fly zone” over the skies of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested that the U.S. create this no-fly zone over Ukraine when he addressed the U.S. Congress. As many already recognize, the U.S. implementing such a no-fly zone has the potential to bring unfathomable consequences. While this debate is extremely important, another development needs further examination: entangling allies—especially exemplified in Poland’s offer to send fighter jets to Ukraine. At essence, Poland sought to send an expected offer of MiG-209 fighter jets to Germany so that the U.S. could send them into Ukraine. In an act of wisdom, U.S. officials dismissed this offer, citing that it did not want to have NATO directly involved in the war. Still, what is to prevent Poland, or another NATO member, from making a bolder decision in the war in Ukraine? What if the U.S. becomes unintentionally entrapped in this war? After all, Carl von Clausewitz asserted in his infamous book, On War, that war is based on chance and uncertainty. We do not want to be caught on the wrong side of chance in this war in Ukraine. The alarm bells of this war spreading can already be heard ringing in the distance. Entangling alliances, or as Barry Posen in his book, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, defines as “reckless drivers,” pose as the main catalyst to the potential widening of this war. The main reckless drivers that are at risk of widening the war in Ukraine are those in NATO. Membership in this alliance comes with a collective security guarantee — known as Article 5. Essentially, if one country is attacked, all members will go to war. Such a provision is especially disturbing with the ongoing war in Ukraine. For one, Russia has issued a warning to the U.S. that Russia would attack American military equipment shipments sent into Ukraine. Of course, this warning is indirectly extended to NATO members as well. There is no guarantee that these NATO countries will be arm-in-arm with every decision of the U.S. in the West’s confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. Countries pursue their own perceived national interests. Should one of these NATO members decide to send military supplies and equipment to Ukraine, it will risk putting a target on its back for the Russians to attack these supply lines. In fact, our eastern NATO allies are already sending deadly weapons to Ukraine to fight and annihilate Russian soldiers — increasing the risk of Russia attacking one of these members. The sinking of the Lusitania during World War I comes to mind as a synonymous case of a country at war attacking its rival’s supply routes of military equipment. What’s more, the NATO countries bordering Ukraine, such as Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary,should be cause for concern for the U.S. Whether the attack is intentional or unintentional, these countries are at risk to Russian missiles and bombs. Russian attacks on Ukraine have inched westward, one of them being upon a base near the city of Lviv, close to Poland. All that is needed for NATO to go to war against Russia is a single missile, or bullet, to cross over into one of these countries.

#### The US should leave NATO before being drawn further into the Russia-Ukraine conflict

El-bawab ’22 (Nadine El-bawab – Nadine graduated from Northwestern University. She is currently a Multimedia reporter for ABC News. “NATO's Article 5 could pull the US and its allies further into the Russia-Ukraine conflict.” ABC News. 3/1/22. https://abcnews.go.com/International/natos-article-pull-us-allies-russia-ukraine-conflict/story?id=83108600)

President Joe Biden repeatedly has said the United States will not be sending troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, but vowed that the U.S. would defend its NATO allies. "As I made crystal clear, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power," he reiterated in an address Thursday. The main goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's founding in 1949 was to foster mutual assistance in response to the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe. A key component of the treaty, Article 5, covers "collective defense," which means that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies. Amid the current crisis, Article 5 could mandate a more direct response from the U.S. and other treaty members if Russian aggression escalates beyond Ukraine. NATO announced last week it launched its response force, a deployment of about 40,000 troops to provide land, air and naval assistance across the alliance. This is the first time the force has been deployed for a "deterrence and defence role," a NATO spokesperson said. Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, told ABC News it is possible Article 5 could be invoked while the U.S. and its allies are providing military aid to Ukraine. “Let's say that Russia succeeds in toppling the government. And it then tries to occupy and pacify Ukraine. Assuming that the U.S. and its allies attempt to get arms to a Ukrainian resistance movement, there's a not insignificant risk that Russia might try to interdict that flow. And that whether by design or by accident, an artillery shell or a missile or a bomb could land in Poland or another NATO country,” Kupchan said. “And then we're looking at the prospect of an attack on NATO territory and the potential trigger of the Article Five collective defense guarantee, which then raises the prospect of potential military conflict between NATO and Russia,” Kupchan said. All participating countries agree to the form of solidarity outlined in the article, making it a key component of the alliance. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it borders Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and Romania, which are members. Ukraine has been moving toward the West and away from Russia, attempting to join both NATO and the European Union. Kupchan said its geographical location could be strategic during this conflict. “In the current moment, Ukraine's border with four NATO countries affords it two important advantages,” Kupchan said. “One is refugees are able to seek asylum in NATO countries, and we're seeing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians head west. And the other is that now that Ukraine's airspace is … dominated by Russia, the long border between Ukraine and NATO affords an opportunity to continue to funnel weapons and other sources of support to Ukraine."

### AT LIO

#### Integration, opportunities for authority, shared economic gains, and widespread accommodation make the current international order stable - it’s not dependent on NATO

Ikenberry 18 (Gilford, theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Ethics & International Affair, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, <https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_survive.pdf>) // nsp

Self-Reinforcing Characteristics of Liberal International Order The United States has dominated the post-war international order. It is an order built on asymmetries of power; it is hierarchical. But it is not an imperial system. It is a complex and multilayered political formation with liberal characteristics— openness and rules-based principles—that generate incentives and opportunities for other states to join and operate within it. Four characteristics reinforce and draw states into the order. **First**, it has integrative tendencies. Over the last century states with diverse characteristics have found pathways into its “ecosystem” of rules and institutions. Germany and Japan found roles and positions of authority in the post-war order; and after the cold war many more states—in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—have joined its economic and security partnerships. It is the multilateral logic of the order that makes it relatively easy for states to join and rise up within the order. **Second**, the liberal order offers opportunities for leadership and shared authority. One state does not “rule” the system. The system is built around institutions, and this provides opportunities for shifting and expanding coalitions of states to share leadership. Formal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are led by boards of directors and weighted voting. Informal groups, such as the G-7 and G-20, are built on principles of collective governance. **Third**, the actual economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared. In colonial and informal imperial systems, the gains from trade and investment are disproportionately enjoyed by the lead state. In the existing order, the “profits of modernity” are distributed across the system. Indeed, China’s great economic ascent was only possible because the liberal international order rewarded its pursuit of openness and trade-oriented growth. For the same reason, states in all regions of the world have made systematic efforts to integrate into the system. **Finally**, the liberal international order accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development. In recent decades the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism has been particularly salient. But the post-war system also provides space for other capitalist models, such as those associated with European social democracy and East Asian developmental statism. The global capitalist system might generate some pressures for convergence, but it also provides space for the coexistence of alternative models and ideologies. These aspects of the liberal international order create incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its core economic and political realms. The order allows states to share in its economic spoils. Its pluralistic character creates possibilities for states to “work the system”—to join in, negotiate, and maneuver in ways that advance their interests. This, in turn, creates an order with expanding constituencies that have a stake in its continuation. Compared to imperial and colonial orders of the past, the existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn.

#### LIO is resilient – Trump era proves

Miller 18 (Paul Miller is an American academic, blogger, and former White House staffer for Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He is a Professor in the Practice of International Affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, July 5 2018, Non-“Western” Liberalism and the Resilience ofthe Liberal International Order, tkk)

The reality of liberalism in the non-western world is strong evidence for the resilience and integrity of the liberal international order, even in the Age of Trump. The greatest victory of the liberal international order was to create new stakeholders for its own survival outside of its original home. The liberal inter-national order now has many pillars supporting it. Even if American power recedes or Eastern European democracy backslides, there are other centers of liberal power in the world. To dismiss non-western democrats as victims of false consciousness is deterministic and flippant—indeed, it is a form of cultural condescension and “Orientalism,” dismissive of the authentically Even if American power recedes, there are other centers of liberal power in the world. Paul D. Miller138THEWASHINGTONQUARTERLY▪SUMMER2018 indigenous pathways to open societies and accountable governance that have arisen in the non-western world. The subject is important because Trump has made a special point of criticizing democracy promotion, as noted above. Trump’s claim about the relationship between liberalism and Western history, then, is central to his“America First”doctrine. Trump’s disbelief in the relevance or plausibility of democracy abroadgives rise to a narrow vision of American interests, one in which the United States can and should prioritize its power and influence without regard for the traditional concerns of its allies or for its values and ideals. But if Trump is wrong about the prospects for liberalism in the non-Western world, then democracy pro-motion can again become an important component of U.S. foreign policy.

### AT US Heg

#### Pursuit of US heg in NATO fuels the Ukraine conflict – fuels mass evacuation, global economic instability, and provokes further escalation

TeleSur ’22 “The US Fuels the Ukrainian Conflict to Maintain its Hegemony.” TeleSur. 3/25/22. https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/The-US-Fuels-the-Ukrainian-Conflict-to-Maintain-its-Hegemony-20220325-0005.html)

A month has passed since Russia launched its special military operation in Ukraine. The United States has not only failed to take practical measures to de-escalate the situation, but continued to "fan the flames" through weapon assistance and sanctions. The root cause of the outbreak of the conflict is the continuous eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To maintain its hegemony, the United States has never hesitated to sacrifice the interests of other countries, including its European allies, which has long caused dissatisfaction among all parties. Russia's concern that NATO is expanding to its borders has never been heeded by the U.S., "which is only interested in maintaining its hegemonic status in Europe, and which has been steadily retreating from that collaborative policy which the West committed itself to after the Cold War," William Jones, Washington bureau chief of Executive Intelligence Review, said. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, the U.S. has kept squeezing Russia's development space through the eastward expansion of NATO, which not only did not disappear with the Cold War but has increasingly gained strength to become a military bloc that engages in bloc confrontation under the leadership of the U.S. In recent years, NATO has also wooed Ukraine to join, which eventually crossed Russia's strategic bottom line. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly warned NATO against deploying its troops and weapons to Ukraine, saying this represents a red line for Russia and would trigger a strong response. In December, Russia presented the United States and NATO with a set of proposals for binding Western security guarantees. Since then, Russia has conducted intensive dialogues with the United States, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on security issues, but no substantial result came out of them. Analysts say the United States is the real initiator of the Ukraine crisis. Till now when Russia and Ukraine are deeply mired in the conflict, the United States is still trying to reap economic and political benefits from this crisis. Shares of U.S. military companies have risen sharply recently. Former Pentagon analyst Franklin Spinney said the U.S. Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex stands to benefit from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as it ramps up defense spending for what could be a protracted affair in Europe. While Washington has made huge bucks from its military industrial complex, it continues to demonize Russia's security threat to Europe and discourage the latter's pursuit of strategic autonomy so as to consolidate its hegemony. MANY COUNTRIES SUFFERING CONSEQUENCES European countries are bound to bear the brunt of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. On one hand, a multitude of Ukrainian evacuees were flocking to other parts of the continent, with knotty problems arising from the mass evacuation; on the other hand, the crisis has also dealt a significant blow to the international trade of energy and agricultural products, threatening the global economic recovery. Obviously, the whole international community will have to pay for this conflict, which broke out owing to Washington's inflaming tensions. According to data updated Wednesday by the UN Refugee Agency, more than 3.67 million Ukrainian people have been displaced. As the situation continues to worsen, the figure is estimated to surpass 4 million. Filippo Grandi, head of the refugee agency, described the Ukraine conflict as "the fastest growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War II" in a recent tweet. "The combined speed and scale of this movement is unprecedented in recent memory," noted the agency's spokesperson Matthew Saltmarsh. The inrush of Ukrainian evacuees of this magnitude may put a strain on the countries accepting them and trigger political and economic problems. In late February, Slovakia has declared a state of emergency in connection with the mass influx of Ukranians. Meanwhile, the crises of energy and food security stemming from the Ukraine conflict also gave Europe a headache. Europe, as a major importer of Russian energy, has been feeling the repercussions of Western sanctions on Russia, given the skyrocketing energy prices in the continent. As the grain supply from Ukraine, widely known as the "breadbasket of Europe," is cut in the short term, and possibly in the long term if the hostilities drag on, the military conflict is expected to further push up food prices. Earlier this month, Jean Pisani-Ferry, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based economic think tank Bruegel, published a blog post assessing the significant economic policy consequences of the Ukraine conflict on the European Union. He estimated that the corresponding short-term direct budgetary cost for the bloc and its members could represent US$193 billion, or about 1.25 percent of GDP in 2022. Following a meeting of the International Monetary Fund Executive Board in early March, the organization cautioned against "very serious" economic consequences of the Ukraine crisis. "Should the conflict escalate, the economic damage would be all the more devastating. The sanctions on Russia will also have a substantial impact on the global economy and financial markets, with significant spillovers to other countries," it warned.

#### American unipolarity sanctions unfettered interventionism, inflaming global conflicts and collapsing multilateral governance regimes.

Glaser, 19 — John Glaser; Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. (3-15-2019; "The Amnesia of the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment;" *Cato Institute*; https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/amnesia-us-foreign-policy-establishment; //GrRv) Trump is certainly hostile to what he sometimes refers to as “globalism”: multilateralism, free trade agreements, international institutions, and any international legal regime that could impose constraints on U.S. power. He is antagonistic toward allies and treaties, withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Human Rights Council. But those excoriating Trump for his disregard for rules and norms rarely mention similar, routine violations of this rules-based order by his predecessors. And while the foreign policy establishment is firm in its condemnation of Trump’s “turning away from global engagement,” as Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations put it, their harshest criticisms seem reserved for those few sporadic instances in which Trump tries to jettison lengthy and failed military deployments, as in Syria and Afghanistan, or expresses insufficient enthusiasm for permanent overseas garrisons. The pundits, practitioners, and politicians that make up the foreign policy establishment have rarely respected the non-interventionist principles at the core of the United Nations, an institution exemplifying the liberal rules-based international order that the United States helped establish following World War II. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter says “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” According to the Charter, which American post-war planners helped write, the use of force is illegal and illegitimate unless at least one of two prerequisites are met: first, that force is used in self-defense; second, that the UN Security Council authorizes it. This prohibition against war is not some trivial aspiration. Non-intervention is the centerpiece of international law and the United Nations has repeatedly sought to underline its significance. In 1965, the General Assembly declared “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state.” Again in 1970, it unanimously reaffirmed the illegality of “armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats.” In 1981, the General Assembly further specified that the Charter’s “principle of non-intervention and non-interference” prohibited “any … form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of another State.” The United States is currently engaged in active military hostilities in at least seven countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. That tally doesn’t include drone strikes in Pakistan, combat operations in Kenya, Cameroon, and Central African Republic, or other interventions of unknown magnitude. The true number might be closer to 14 countries. The White House is also explicitly threatening U.S. military action to change the regime in Venezuela and against Iran for a host of spurious reasons. Not one of these cases meets the prerequisites for legal military intervention (a plausible self-defense case can be made for the war in Afghanistan, but it expired a long time ago). No other state in the international system uses force more than the U.S. has. Throughout the Cold War, the United States used military means to interfere in other countries about twice as often as did the Soviet Union. This doesn’t include interventions below the threshold of military action: from 1946 to 2000, Washington meddled in foreign elections more than 80 times (compared to 36 by the Soviet Union or Russia over the same period). Covert operations to overthrow democratically elected governments, as in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, were a staple of U.S. conduct in this period, and according to the Rand Corporation, “the number and scale of U.S. military interventions rose rapidly in the aftermath of the Cold War.” The Congressional Research Service lists more than 200 individual U.S. military interventions from 1989 to 2018, a rate that no other country even comes close to matching. It’s hard for America to act as the guarantor of a rules-based order that it consistently violates. When President Obama condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, saying international law prohibits redrawing territorial borders “at the barrel of a gun,” it was somewhat awkward: The United States did exactly that in the 1999 Kosovo war, which lacked Security Council approval, and successive administrations have similarly supported Israel as it annexes and occupies territory in violation of international law. Secretary of State John Kerry castigated Russia’s territorial grab this way: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext.” As it happens, that’s a rather apt description of the Bush administration’s brazenly illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003. Washington often appeals to international law to justify military action against despots who commit atrocities, as it did when it secured UN Security Council approval in 2011 to bomb Libya. But even there, when the initial use of force was authorized, the Obama administration rapidly exceeded the mandate of the resolution by pursuing what amounted to a regime-change strategy. And such appeals to humanitarianism are highly selective: U.S. military power has also been used to assist Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most regressive authoritarian regimes, commit war crimes and keep an impoverished and largely defenseless population in Yemen under siege. America’s delinquency isn’t restricted to the use of force. Though 139 other countries have done so, Washington has refused to sign on to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court. And although the United States has badgered China for violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines maritime rights and responsibilities, the U.S. refuses to ratify the treaty itself. For all the talk of China’s unfair trade practices, the only country that receives more formal complaints about WTO violations than China is the United States—and China does a better job of complying once complaints are made. The political establishment in Washington has always accepted this unique role for the United States. We’re the policeman of the world. We enforce the rules and therefore assert the right to violate them, even as we (often violently) deny others that same prerogative. Any claim to special privileges rests to some extent on whether the international community sees it as legitimate. The problem is that America’s increasing disregard for the rules has undermined its legitimacy and that of the order itself: More than any other single nation, its actions determine the basis of international norms. As U.S. foreign policy becomes more transparently lawless, the power of international law to constrain state behavior weakens accordingly. To legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin actually cited the “Kosovo precedent.” In 2016, Chinese officials dismissed U.S. criticisms of Beijing’s human rights record by citing the “notorious…prison abuse at Guantanamo.” The United States, Chinese diplomat Fu Cong told the UN Council on Human Rights, “conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to attack other countries’ innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and uses black prisons.” And when American officials lambaste Iran for backing the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad despite his use of chemical weapons, Iranian officials frequently remind the world that the United States aided Saddam Hussein while he deployed chemical weapons on a much larger scale. Our hypocrisy has always been a threat to our legitimacy, but in the past it was often managed with careful rhetoric and diplomatic maneuvers designed to conceal the discrepancy between our words and our deeds, to camouflage our violations in language that reinforced the order or appealed to higher values. Trump is distinct from his predecessors not because his foreign policy is a radical departure, but because he is carrying out similar policies without the moralistic righteousness of his predecessors . Saving the liberal order means adhering to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense or unless authorized by the Security Council. It means rolling back our global military footprint and adopting a more restrained foreign policy that at least approximates the manner in which we expect other nations to behave. It means recognizing that the United States is not exempt from the rules and norms it often punishes others for transgressing, and it means acknowledging that the foreign policy establishment has done at least as much damage to the rules-based order as has President Trump.

#### Effective global governance is key to regulate dangerous applications of emerging tech — extinction.

Bailey, 18 — Robert Bailey; Professional technologist and strategic manager. Robert earned his Master of Science Degree in Computer science in 2009, and has worked since then has a product engineer developing Microsoft stack technologies. (9-5-2018; "Why do we need global governance?" *Global Governance*; https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/; //GrRv)

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen. The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3 We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier. There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4 Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves. Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination. Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

## NATO Good

### Generic – 2AC

#### NATO collapse would be catastrophic – Russian and Chinese encroachment, European populism, US heg decline, and collapse of the LIO

\*this card is also in the NATO Withdrawl CP file – slightly different cut

Binnendijk ‘19 (Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as senior director for defense policy on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council. “5 consequences of a life without NATO”. March 19, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/)

Most people retire by age 70. Next month, NATO turns 70. U.S. President Donald Trump has now been joined by Barry Posen, a so-called realist political scientist, in suggesting that it may be time for the alliance to retire as well. To see if they are correct, let’s consider what international life might be like without NATO. There would be at least five set of consequences, all negative. The most catastrophic impact of NATO’s retirement would be the risk of Russian aggression and miscalculation. Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will certainly see opportunities to seize land he believes is Russian. He has already done this in Georgia and Ukraine. Had they not joined NATO, the Baltic states would probably already be occupied by Russian troops. Certainly Putin would also see an opportunity to seize more of Ukraine without the “shadow” of NATO to protect it. History teaches us that major wars start when aggressive leaders miscalculate. German leader Adolf Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, believing that after then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement, England would be unlikely to respond. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 after the United States appeared to remove Seoul from its defensive perimeter. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, believing the United States had signaled that it would not respond. In each case, miscalculation led to larger conflict. Secondly, NATO’s retirement would also decrease American military reach, its political influence and its economic advantage. American bases throughout Europe not only provide for the defense of Europe — they bring the U.S. a continent closer to trouble spots that threaten vital American interests. Fighting the Islamic State group, clearly an American interest, would have been markedly more difficult without permanent U.S. bases in Europe and without the American-built coalition that included every NATO nation. Without NATO, the mutual security interests that underpin both U.S. bases and coalition operations would be undermined. This extends to the economic realm. U.S. annual trade in goods and services with Europe exceeds $1 trillion, and U.S. total direct investment in Europe nears $3 trillion. These economic ties enhance U.S. prosperity and provide American jobs, but they require the degree of security now provided by NATO to endure. NATO’s retirement would thirdly exacerbate divisions within Europe. NATO’s glue not only holds European militaries together — it provides the principal forum to discuss and coordinate security issues. The European Union is unlikely to substitute for NATO in this respect because it has no military structure, few capabilities and no superpower leadership to bring divergent views together. Germany and France already seek a plan B should NATO collapse, but without the United Kingdom in the European Union, an all-European approach is likely to fail. The added insecurity of NATO’s collapse would also amplify current populist movements in Europe. The consequence could be renationalization of European militaries, a system that brought conflict to the 19th and early 20th centuries. The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing. Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success. The final impact of NATO’s retirement would be the near collapse of what has been called the “liberal international order.” This order consists of treaties, alliances, agreements, institutions and modes of behavior mostly created by the United States in an effort to safeguard democracies. This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades. The Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this order. NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity. So the answer is clear. Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous. Russia and China would be the big winners at America’s expense. NATO simply can’t retire. Yes, NATO has problems. It needs to be managed. But there is too much left to be done for retirement. And there is too much to lose if NATO fails.

### Generic – 1AR

#### The alternative is war

Berlinski 7-15-2018 – PhD in IR @ Oxford (Claire, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan: Postwar U.S. statesmen designed our world order as it is for a reason. They had lived through what happened without it.,” *Politico*, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011>)

Trump’s NATO-bashing surprised no one. He has repeatedly suggested the United States’ postwar security architecture is a “bad deal,” one negotiated by weak and foolish “incompetents.” Foreign policy, in his view, is a zero-sum game; any benefit to another nation must of necessity be a loss for the United States. “NATO countries,” he declared on Twitter, “must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!” Unfair? A world that revolves around American military, economic and cultural power, and uses the U.S. dollar as its reserve currency? What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock. Charles de Gaulle believed the Anglophone world could not, in the long term, be trusted with French security. It led him to withdraw France from NATO’s military integrated command and launch an independent nuclear development program. The independent nuclear program was real, but the withdrawal from NATO wasn’t—a secret agreement kept France in NATO anyway. But, today, with other NATO members obliged to consider the costs and benefits of an independent accommodation with Russia and the risks and rewards of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle is saying from the grave, I told you so. The American-led world order, undergirded by the ideal of liberal democracy, has been highly imperfect. But it has been the closest thing to Utopia our fallen and benighted species has ever seen. Its benefits are not just economic, although those benefits are immense. Its benefits must be measured in wars not fought, lives not squandered. Yet many Americans have turned their backs on history and reality alike. Let us hope pride does not prevent them from realizing this mistake before it’s far too late.

#### NATO alliance is key to the economy and solve global security issues – terrorism, climate change, and pandemics

**Burns**, former American NATO ambassador, July 11, **18** (Nicholas, “What America Gets Out of NATO”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html>) DR

None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to protect North America and Europe — the heart of the democratic world — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. NATO is a force multiplier: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has relied on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle East. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: climate change; drug and cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China. Mr. Trump’s campaign to undermine the European Union and diminish America’s leadership in NATO serves none of these interests. He seems driven by resentment about European trade surpluses and low defense budgets, issues that blind him to all the other benefits Americans derive from our alliance with Europe and Canada. Mr. Trump may believe his blistering attacks on Europe’s trade policies and defense budgets are a good negotiating tactic before the summit. But in fact they have already done enormous damage. While **he cannot** outright **kill NATO** — the American public and Congress support it too strongly — he has eroded significant levels of trust and good will. As it became clear during my recent visits across Europe, a dangerous breach has opened in the trans-Atlantic alliance — by far the worst in seven decades. Mr. Trump wants Americans to believe that their allies are simply taking advantage of them. On Sept. 11, 2001, I witnessed a far different reality as American ambassador to NATO. Canada and the European allies volunteered within hours of the attacks to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which compels all members to respond to an attack on any single member, for the first time in history. They came to our defense when we most needed them. They sent troops to fight with us in Afghanistan. They are still there with us 17 years later. Are we now going to throw off that mutual protection, and go it alone in a dangerous 21st-century world? That would be a historic mistake. But that is where we may find ourselves if Mr. Trump’s anti-Europe vendetta continues.

### LIO – 1AR

Extend Binnendijk ‘19

#### NATO underpins the LIO – increasing cooperative security is key to its survival

Miller ’18 (Paul Miller - Professor in the Practice of International Affairs, Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow. “This is How the Liberal International Order Dies.” Atlantic Council. 6/12/18. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/this-is-how-the-liberal-international-order-dies/)

Last year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, after meeting US President Donald J. Trump at the NATO Summit in Brussels, “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over…We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” That she said it on Memorial Day weekend—the day the United States honors veterans of World War II—seemed an especially sharp rebuke. Worse than the rebuke was this: Merkel might not be wrong. Trump threatened at this week’s NATO Summit in Brussels to “do his own thing,” if allies did not increase their defense spending. That comment came on the heels of his administration having publicly floated the idea of withdrawing US troops stationed in Germany, already at their lowest level since they first crossed the Rhine in 1944. The withdrawal of the United States from NATO, or of US troops from Germany, would represent a tectonic shift in geopolitics unparalleled in the postwar era. NATO is the signature pillar of the liberal international order, given teeth by the presence of US troops on the European Continent. As the collective security organization of the world’s most powerful liberal democracies, NATO embodied the free world’s cooperative effort to build and sustain a world that reflected its values. Today, the transatlantic alliance—and the liberal international order it underpins—is at its lowest ebb in its 69-year history. Some European policymakers have publicly contemplated a European nuclear deterrent in lieu of the US security guarantee. The United States’ closest allies in world’s most powerful and important strategic region are moving toward replacing cooperative security with rearmament and proliferation. This is how the liberal international order dies.

#### LIO is an impact filter it’s key to solve prolif, econ security, ecological preservation, climate change, and security threats

[Nye, Joseph, 18, Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. is an American political scientist. He is the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory of neoliberalism, "A Time for Positive-Sum Power," The Wilson Quarterly, <https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/2178877973/327C64261E704465PQ/4?accountid=14667>] //WY

Wilson's liberal legacy, however, was two-fold: the promotion of liberal democracy and the creation of multilateral institutions. Order rests on a relatively stable distribution of power, as realists like Mearsheimer correctly describe, but it also benefits from an institutional framework that enhances cooperation to manage security, economic, and ecological interdependence. Alliances can enhance stability, but security is also enhanced by the existence of institutions like the United Nations and the non-proliferation regime. Economic globalization can be disruptive, but it also creates wealth, and cooperation to maintain financial stability can be crucial to the lives of millions of Americans and foreigners alike. And whatever happens to economic globalization, ecological globalization will remain. The politics of science denial does not reverse physical forces. States will need a framework to enhance cooperation for uses of the sea, space, and coping with climate change. Referring to such frameworks as a liberal international order conflates the two aspects of Wilson's liberal legacy. The degree of policy intervention a president chooses regarding democracy promotion is different from the degree of support for multilateral institutions designed to cope with security and modern interconnectedness. We can criticize excesses like the effort to democratize Iraq at the point of a gun without criticizing the overall liberal order of institutions that manage interdependence. The U.S. and Global Public Goods After Wilson sent two million Americans to fight in Europe and tipped the outcome of the war, it was clear that the U.S. was not only the world's largest economy, but also crucial to the global balance of power. In the absence of a global government, the world depends on the most powerful country to provide a degree of order and global public goods, such as security, economic stability, and protection of global commons, like freedom of the seas. But when the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson's League of Nations, the U.S. failed to act in its new role, and instead continued to behave as a free rider in the provision of global public goods (which Britain had led in the 19th century but could no longer afford). Instead, America "returned to normal." Public opinion came to see intervention in World War I and efforts to create a world order as a huge mistake. The United States became isolationist in the 1930s, and not even the eloquence of Franklin Roosevelt could persuade the American people to stand up to Hitler's threat. The absence of an American-led liberal order resulted in an immoral decade of economic depression, genocide, and world war. Roosevelt saw the mistakes of the 1930s and began a planning process to create the Bretton Woods international economic institutions in 1944 and the UN in 1945. The turning point was Harry Truman's post-war decisions that led to permanent alliances and a military presence abroad. When Britain was too weak to support Greece and Turkey in 1947, the U.S. took its place. It invested heavily in the Marshall Plan in 1948, created NATO a year later, and led a UN coalition that fought in Korea in 1950. In 1960, Dwight Eisenhower signed a new security treaty with Japan. While Americans have had bitter debates and partisan differences over intervention in countries such as Vietnam, and more recently, Iraq, the issue of a liberal international order has been much less contentious. These actions were part of the strategy of containment of Soviet power, a realist policy that could be interpreted in various ways. Some decisions had questionable ethical justification, such as the overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran, Congo, and elsewhere. Perhaps most notorious was the intervention in Vietnam, where a series of American presidents feared the domestic political consequences as much as the international ones. Intervention was justified by a metaphor of dominos falling to communism, and the ultimate effect of such a scenario on the balance of power in a bipolar world. While Americans have had bitter debates and partisan differences over intervention in countries such as Vietnam, and more recently, Iraq, the issue of a liberal international order has been much less contentious. The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr praised the "fortunate vagueness of liberal internationalism" which saves it from ideological rigidity. Unfortunately, with victory in the Cold War and a unipolar structure of world power, Americans succumbed to hubris. The liberal scholar Tony Smith argues in Why Wilson Matters that the result was "neo-Wilsonianism," a combination of neoliberalism and neoconservatism that combined global markets, forceful democracy promotion, and American leadership. Meanwhile, at home, a significant number of voters felt leftout politically and economically.

### US Heg – 1AR

Extend Binnendijk ‘19

#### US leadership in NATO is key to the global perception of the US hegemony

Wingrove ’22 (Josh Wingrove - White House reporter, Bloomberg News .” NATO Nations’ Faith in U.S. Leadership Saw Biden Bump, Poll Says.” Bloomberg. 3/22/22. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-23/nato-nations-faith-in-u-s-leadership-saw-biden-bump-poll-says)

People living in NATO nations reported sharply higher confidence in U.S. global leadership during President Joe Biden’s first year in office than during the last year of Donald Trump’s presidency, according to newly released findings from Gallup, signaling support that Biden will draw on this week in pushing for renewed pressure on Russia. Polling from more than two dozen NATO nations showed nearly all saw an increase in approval ratings in 2021, as compared to 2020, when asked about perceptions of U.S. leadership abroad. The survey indicates that Europe’s faith in the U.S. rebounded from lows seen in the Trump administration. The median approval rating rose to 41%, from 18% the previous year, the results show, though approval remains below levels seen in the final years of the Obama administration. “This positions the U.S. very well, compared to the past,” said Julie Ray, a Gallup editor. “It’s in a better position now than it was with the previous administration, in terms of audiences being receptive and engaging in U.S. leadership and being open to it.” The data, compiled last year and released Wednesday, are part of a global survey. Some of the findings were from before the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last August, while some were after. It’s not clear what impact that had, Ray said. By comparison, views toward Russian and Chinese actions abroad were relatively unchanged, Ray added.

#### Lack of American leadership in NATO collapsesUS hegemony and democracy, while spurring an arms race

Berlinkski, PhD, 18 (Claire, American journalist and author – doctorate in Internal Relations, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan,” <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011)//EF>

What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; **by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars**. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state**. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence.** With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights **cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism**. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, **the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition.** This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share**. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished**. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. **Profound economic interdependence,** they believed, **would make further European wars impossible.** At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. **This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties.** Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—**a theory with overwhelming empirical support.** The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. **American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment.** (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) **In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system**. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—**would bring modern life to an end.** The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that**. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous.** The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet **Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years.** It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. **Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents** toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees**, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe.** Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded**. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant.** We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, **the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous.** Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. **America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock.**

#### Collapse of NATO would wreck US hegemony – removes network of diplomatic and military capabilities and forecloses agenda-setting power to new regional blocs

Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis, “Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” <https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF>

The decline of American hegemony has been proclaimed many times, but the US has continued to be the sole superpower on the block. Yet the 2016 election might go down in history as the turning point – if the new administration follows through with its plan to put ‘America First’ and withdraws from international responsibilities. **This policy change puts European collective action capacity to a test, leaving the EU to carry on the torch of liberal values and democracy in the global world order**. Following the Brexit shock, EU leaders agree on a communications and legitimacy offensive to fend off populist movements in the wake of Brexit. Europe’s foreign policy apparatus evolves. As the EEAS gains experience and fine-tunes its working relationship with member states and the EU Commission, the changes intended by the Lisbon treaty begin to materialize in practical terms. The center of gravity for day-to-day foreign policy moves to the European level, not least because EU mxembers are happy to consolidate expensive foreign operations. **At the same time, the United States decrease their footprint in terms of both diplomatic and military capabilities abroad.** US foreign policy focuses on core regions and tasks, which means cutting back on large-scale diplomatic initiatives, early warning and conflict resolution, or intelligence analysis. These policy shifts draw heavy criticism from European allies and the transatlantic relationship suffers − also because the new US administration uses a different tone and style towards the old allies. These organizational and strategic changes are reflected in policy choices. In United Nations negotiations on climate change, the EU is the only actor that comes close to China’s willingness and capacity for leadership. Participants in transatlantic working groups discover that their goals are not aligned. In addition, US negotiators are much less enthusiastic about investing political capital and resources in global governance. UN operational budgets across the board are sharply reduced reflecting a reduction in US contributions that cannot be compensated by others. Thus, while the UN remains a forum for deliberation, its agencies lose practical relevance in global governance. At the same time, the member states of the European Union come to terms with the fact that their transatlantic partner seems less willing to assume a leadership role. A number of governments and the foreign-policy institutions in Brussels take on more responsibility in regional and global affairs. As a result, EU policymakers focus more heavily on inter-regional cooperation with organizations from Africa, Latin America and Asia. **A number of so-called ‘intensive partnership’ treaties with regional blocs and individual emerging powers address cross-border issues, such as migration and the fight against crime.** In trade and investment, regional arrangements increasingly replace the WTO, which is in hibernation due to the United States’ refusal to champion further trade liberalization on a global scale. NATO suffers from funding cuts and is strictly limited to its core mandate for territorial defense, while the UN Security Council drops from gridlock to paralysis. Military interventions still take place – but only based on ad-hoc coalitions. For the EU this means creating a more deeply integrated but still voluntary defense framework with a focus on security in the near abroad and African countries of strategic interest. A first indicator for this scenario is a shift in US foreign policy from a global leadership role to a few selected initiatives. **American agenda-setting power on the global stage is reduced as foreign-policy priorities change, but also because European allies in turn focus on other partners and opportunities**. EU-internal changes in the institutional setup and practice of foreign policy are another indicator to consider. The clearest sign of this scenario, however, would be bolder and more controversial European actions on the global arena – both diplomatically and militarily.

#### Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history. Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers. Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America? Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38 These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come. The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### Military primacy solves economic growth, prolif, and great-power war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 5: The Contemporary Amnesia; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States.11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability.12

### AT Entanglement

#### Most comprehensive research shows US entanglement is rare

Priebe et al ’21 (Miranda Priebe - Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University. Director, Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy; Senior Political Scientist. “ Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the U.S. in Conflict.” RAND Corporation. August 2021. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-3/RAND\_RRA739-3.pdf)

U.S. allies and partners sometimes become involved in conflicts contrary to direct U.S. interests, whether because of emboldenment or for other reasons. In this chapter, we ask whether the United States defends its allies and partners in such situations because of concerns about U.S. credibility. We also consider whether the United States becomes involved in conflict because of other forms of interest expansion, such as socialization with its allies and partners over the course of the relationship. In other words, we ask whether entanglement ultimately occurs in U.S. alliances and partnerships. One challenge in answering this question is that there is no clear standard for the extent to which alliance considerations must play a role in U.S. decision making for a case to qualify as entanglement. There are usually many factors that affect state decisions about engaging in conflict, especially entering a war.1 Therefore, demanding that alliance dynamics be the only explanation for U.S. entry to conflict would be setting too high a bar. Rather, in this chapter, we discuss cases in which entanglement contributed to a U.S. decision to enter a conflict. As research in this area continues, it would be helpful to identify not just how often these dynamics take place but also how important they are relative to other factors. The extent to which entanglement plays a role varies in each of the cases that we discuss in this chapter. In every case that we discuss, there are multiple reasons that the United States is engaged in conflict, even though we focus primarily on describing entanglement dynamics. More research is needed to determine how much these dynamics contributed in each individual case. In the previous chapter, we identified cases in which the United States chose not to enter wars to support allies and partners that initiated conflict despite U.S. objections. For example, the United States did not fight to support Britain and France during the Suez Crisis, in 1956. The United States thought that the intervention was misguided, would harm Western relations with countries in the Middle East and Africa, would undermine U.S. domestic political support for NATO, and would lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union.2 Similarly, the United States did not enter the conflict to support Israel in the Six-Day War or Georgia in its 2008 war with Russia. Ashford also notes that the United States chose not to intervene in Rwanda despite allies and partners prompting it to do so.3 Beckley’s analysis is the most comprehensive analysis of the U.S. experience with entanglement. He examined every interstate conflict the United States engaged in between 1948 and 2010 and asked whether U.S. involvement was due to alliance entanglement. He also included the U.S. partnerships with Israel and Taiwan in the analysis. Beckley argues that direct U.S. interests drove U.S. involvement in most conflicts but finds evidence of entanglement dynamics in five cases: the 1954–1955 and 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Even in these cases, though, Beckley downplays the importance of entanglement by arguing that direct U.S. interests dominated the decision to intervene. In nine other cases, Beckley finds that entanglement dynamics may have occurred but dismisses them given lower levels of U.S. military involvement. Ultimately, Beckley concludes that entanglement is rare.4

#### The wording of Article 5 strategically prevents entanglement

Priebe et al ’21 (Miranda Priebe - Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University. Director, Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy; Senior Political Scientist. “ Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the U.S. in Conflict.” RAND Corporation. August 2021. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-3/RAND\_RRA739-3.pdf)

We next consider whether the United States has tried to reduce the risk of entanglement through the negotiation of conditional alliance terms. The North Atlantic Treaty is an example of a conditional defense agreement because it does not require an automatic response to an attack on a NATO member. Rather, Article 5 of the treaty calls on each member to take “such action as it deems necessary” if another member is attacked.8 This choice of wording stemmed, at least in part, from U.S. congressional concerns that earlier drafts contained language that interfered with Congress’s constitutional power to declare war.9 The North Atlantic Treaty is also geographically limited to Europe and North America and does not include, for example, commitments to defend against attacks on allies’ colonial holdings.10 As noted earlier, all U.S. alliances are conditional, although the degree and nature of conditionality vary.

#### Arguments of US entanglement are too broad – further research needed

Priebe et al ’21 (Miranda Priebe - Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University. Director, Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy; Senior Political Scientist. “ Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the U.S. in Conflict.” RAND Corporation. August 2021. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-3/RAND\_RRA739-3.pdf)

Although more research is needed on the U.S. experience of entanglement, there are some useful findings that we can offer U.S. policymakers based on the existing literature. In at Least Five Cases, Entanglement Dynamics Contributed to, but Were Not the Only Cause of, U.S. Involvement in Conflict; More Research Is Needed on How Prevalent and Consequential These Dynamics Are. The existing literature shows that the United States became involved in two crises over Taiwan at least in part because of concerns about U.S. credibility being on the line. Concerns about U.S. credibility with allies, partners, and adversaries appear to have contributed to U.S. involvement in these cases as well as in the Korean War and Vietnam War. The U.S. intervention in Libya also displays entanglement dynamics because the United States supported its allies in a conflict despite the lack of a vital U.S. interest at stake. In each case, entanglement dynamics contributed to but were not the only cause of a U.S. intervention. Scholars have suggested several other potential cases of entanglement dynamics at work, including U.S. involvement in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, more in-depth analysis of these cases is needed to make a definitive conclusion about the role of entanglement dynamics. At the same time, entanglement does not occur in every case of conflict involving U.S. allies and partners. The United States has chosen, in some cases, such as the Suez Crisis, not to support its allies and partners that become involved in conflicts contrary to U.S. interests. This mixed picture suggests that more research is needed on U.S. entanglement dynamics to determine how prevalent and consequential they are and when they are most likely to take place. For some analysts, the small number of known cases of entanglement dynamics across the history of U.S. security relationships suggests that entanglement concerns should not weigh heavily in decisions about U.S. alliance and partnership choices going forward. For others, even a small number of consequential examples is troubling. Ultimately, policymakers and the public have to make a normative choice about how to weigh these risks against other costs and benefits of U.S. alliances and partnerships. More empirical work on entanglement will provide a stronger basis for these assessments.

#### (AT BOSNIA) Not enough evidence that entanglement spurred US involvement in Bosnia – it was more likely a case of interest expansion

Priebe et al ’21 (Miranda Priebe - Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University. Director, Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy; Senior Political Scientist. “ Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the U.S. in Conflict.” RAND Corporation. August 2021. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-3/RAND\_RRA739-3.pdf)

Although the methodological issues above mean that there might be cases of entanglement that Beckley missed or that are more meaningful than he allows, there are also cases in which the evidence that he presents is not decisive. This is because Beckley asks whether alliance considerations affected U.S. decisionmaking in each case but does not provide evidence that alliance considerations constituted entanglement. For example, Beckley notes that, after NATO made threats against Serbia for its actions in Kosovo in 1998, the United States felt that NATO credibility was on the line. When Serbia did not meet NATO demands, the United States felt that NATO had to intervene. This is certainly an alliance consideration. However, Beckley does not show what made U.S. leaders put NATO credibility at stake by issuing the threat in the first place. Other analysis suggests that U.S. humanitarian concerns motivated the United States to seek NATO involvement and that allies tried to restrain the United States from using force earlier in the crisis.25 Similar questions surround the U.S. intervention in Bosnia in the 1990s. The Clinton administration had said that it would intervene to protect NATO allies with peacekeepers in Bosnia, which Beckley argues was intended to keep these allies from pulling their forces. When these peacekeepers were seriously threatened in 1995, the administration intervened in part to help its allies and because it saw NATO credibility as being on the line.26 However, Beckley does not explain why the United States believed that NATO’s credibility was at stake, why the United States promoted air strikes as early as 1993, or why the United States had become involved in military operations related to Bosnia, such as Operation Deny Flight, prior to 1995.27 Ultimately, more evidence is necessary to show that entanglement drove U.S. involvement in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. For example, future analysis could consider the possibility that this and the earlier intervention in Bosnia might be a case of interest expansion, in which the United States came to see any instability in Europe as a threat to U.S. allies.28 In both cases, more in-depth analysis will be possible as government documents from this period are declassified.

#### Alliances don’t cause entanglement and promote restraint

Beckley 15 Michael Beckley is Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and assistant professor of political science at Tufts University.6-9-2015, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/06/the-myth-of-entangling-alliances/> - BS

For the first 165 years of its history, the United States did not form any alliances besides the one it signed with France during the Revolutionary War. Instead, U.S. leaders followed George Washington’s advice to “steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world,” a recommendation subsequently enshrined in Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural pledge: “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.” Since World War II, however, U.S. leaders have reversed course and signed defense pacts with more than 60 countries. As a result, the United States is legally obligated to defend a patchwork of nations that spans five continents, contains 25 percent of the earth’s population, and accounts for nearly 75 percent of global economic output. To what extent does this massive commitment entangle the United States in wars it would otherwise avoid? This is a pivotal question for U.S. foreign policy — and one that increasingly divides U.S. policymakers from many of the nation’s most prominent international relations scholars. U.S. political leaders almost uniformly support allied engagement, and President Barack Obama recently reaffirmed U.S. commitments to defend allies during crises between North and South Korea, Iran and Israel, Russia and Ukraine, and China on the one hand and Japan and the Philippines on the other. A growing number of scholars, however, argue that such commitments are dangerous and should be abandoned. According to these scholars, America’s alliances are not assets but rather “transmission belts for war” that “risk roping the United States into conflicts over strategically marginal territory.” Several scholars even compare the U.S. alliance network to the tangled web of European security commitments that helped catalyze World War I. To avoid getting sucked into foreign wars, these scholars argue, the United States should scale back its alliance network or scrap it altogether — measures that, if implemented, would constitute the biggest shift in U.S. grand strategy in two generations. Are these fears of entangling alliances warranted? To find out, I analyzed every U.S. military conflict since 1948 (the year the United States signed its first peacetime alliance) and asked a basic question: To what extent was U.S. involvement driven by formal alliance commitments? The results, which are published in an article in International Security, are surprising: U.S. entanglement almost never happens. Over a 65-year period in which the United States had more than 60 formal allies, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement — the 1954 and 1995/96 Taiwan Strait Crises; the Vietnam War; and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s — and even these cases are far from clear-cut. In each case there were other important drivers of U.S. involvement, U.S. policymakers carefully limited support for allies, allies restrained the United States from escalating its involvement, the United States deterred adversaries and allies from escalating the conflict, or all of the above. Against this limited evidence of entanglement, I find many cases in which alliances restrained the United States, or in which the United States restrained its allies or sidestepped costly commitments. I only examine U.S. military conflicts and therefore cannot evaluate fully the prevalence of such cases of peace, but even within my biased sample, there are at least four cases in which alliances prevented U.S. escalation, and another seven cases in which the United States reneged on security commitments and/or restrained an ally from attacking a third party. Of course, the United States has fought alongside allies on numerous occasions. But in most cases, U.S. actions were driven by an alignment of interests between the United States and its allies, not by alliance obligations. In fact, in many cases, U.S. policymakers were the main advocates of military intervention and cajoled reluctant allies to join the fight. At worst, therefore, alliances have had a mixed effect on U.S. involvement in military conflicts — some alliances at times have encouraged U.S. military involvement, others have discouraged it, and some have simply been ignored by U.S. policymakers. The risk of entanglement is not trivial, but historically, U.S. policymakers have managed this risk by inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, shirking costly commitments, maintaining a diversified alliance portfolio that generates offsetting demands from different allies, and using explicit alliance commitments to deter adversaries and restrain allies from initiating or escalating conflicts. Ultimately, this indicates that allied engagement does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment” — the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may simply unshackle the United States and enable it to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry. A better route to a disciplined defense policy would be to (1) bolster congressional constraints on the president’s ability to send U.S. forces into battle; (2) develop guidelines governing the use of force and make them the centerpiece of national debate before every potential military intervention; and (3) retain allies, who can provide U.S. leaders with a second opinion on the merits of potential interventions, political cover when U.S. leaders decide not to intervene, and troops, supplies, intelligence, and money when the United States does intervene. In short, military restraint is best pursued through allied engagement, burden-sharing, and domestic reform — not retrenchment. To be sure, some security commitments may need to be revised or dissolved for specific reasons. But history shows that most allies most of the time help keep U.S. troops at home by bearing some of the burden of U.S. wars and by encouraging the United States to stay out of wars altogether. Large-scale retrenchment would sacrifice these and other benefits of alliances while doing little to compel U.S. leaders to define national interests modestly or choose military interventions selectively. How to avoid foolish wars and achieve strategic solvency will continue to be the subject of debate, but those debates will be more productive if they focus on domestic culprits rather than foreign friends. Americans tend to blame their military misadventures on allies, but the blame for these debacles, and the responsibility for avoiding future fiascos, lies at home.

#### Putin won’t escalate with nuclear weapons – guaranteed retaliation deters him

Mohammed and Emmott ’22 (Arshad Mohammed and Robin Emmott. Writers for Reuters “Explainer: Will Russia use nuclear weapons?” Reuters. 5/6/22. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/might-russia-use-nuclear-weapons-ukraine-war-2022-05-06/)

U.S. officials quickly called Putin's comments about putting Russian nuclear forces on high alert dangerous, escalatory and totally unacceptable, while NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg criticized them as aggressive and irresponsible. However, U.S. officials also immediately made clear they had seen no signs Russian forces had changed their nuclear posture and the U.S. military said it saw no need to alter its own. On Feb. 28, U.S. President Joe Biden told Americans not to worry about a nuclear war with Russia. Responding to a shouted question about whether U.S. citizens should be concerned about a nuclear war erupting, Biden said "no." read more WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF RUSSIA USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS? Biden's comment appeared to reflect a widespread view among U.S. experts and Western officials that the chances of Russia using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war are extremely low. "Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power ... has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons," Gideon Rose, the former editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, wrote last week. "Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them," he added. The main aim of Russia's elliptical threats of a nuclear strike seems to be to deter Washington and its NATO allies from direct involvement in the war, experts and Western diplomats said. "They are not credible," said one Western diplomat who like others spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "He is trying to scare the West." HOW MIGHT RUSSIA USE A NUCLEAR WEAPON? While Western nations have poured arms into Ukraine since the invasion, Biden last year said putting U.S. troops on the ground in Ukraine was "not on the table." read more The United States and its allies have no desire to get into a conventional shooting war with Russia, let alone do anything that might spark a nuclear exchange. If Russia were to use nuclear weapons, experts saw a range of possibilities, from a detonation over the Black Sea or an uninhabited part of Ukraine to demonstrate its capabilities to a strike against a Ukrainian military target or on a city. However, using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine could endanger Russian troops and draw radioactive blowback on Russia itself.

#### Without NATO troops in Ukraine, Putin won’t use nukes

Dhanesha ’22 (Neel Dhanesha - Recode & Science Fellow. “How to think about the risk of nuclear war, according to 3 experts.” Vox. 2/27/22. https://www.vox.com/22951004/nuclear-weapons-russia-ukraine-war-putin)

How worried should we be about the threat of nuclear weapons right now? When Russia first invaded Ukraine, the scholars who spoke to Vox said a nuclear strike is unlikely but still a cause for concern, given that the invasion introduced the largest military operation in Europe since the Second World War. “I’m more worried than I was a week ago,” Kristensen said. He pointed out that NATO increased its readiness levels for “all contingencies” in response to Putin’s speech, and with increased military buildup comes increased uncertainty. “That’s the fog of war, so to speak,” Kristensen said. “Out of that can come twists and turns that take you down a path that you couldn’t predict a week ago.” When asked about Putin’s decision to place his nuclear forces on higher alert, Kristensen said, “There is nothing in Russia’s stated public nuclear doctrine that justifies this.” He added, “Putin has now taken yet another step that unnecessarily escalates the situation to what appears to be a direct nuclear threat.” Matthew Bunn, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and former adviser to President Bill Clinton’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, initially told Vox, “I think there is virtually no chance nuclear weapons are going to be used in the Ukraine situation.” The main reason, Bunn said, is that the United States and its NATO allies have made it clear that they will not send troops to Ukraine. Without the threat of military intervention, Putin has little reason to use his nuclear weapons, especially since Russia has a staggering numbers advantage over the Ukrainian military. Bunn qualified his statements after Putin’s escalation. “No one outside of Putin’s inner circle knows for sure why Putin has taken this action,” he said in an email. “My guess — and it’s only that — is that it is intended as further signaling to deter anyone in the West from even thinking about intervening militarily to help Ukraine.” Paul Hare, senior lecturer in global studies at Boston University, argued that Putin’s real goal is to “swallow Ukraine” and restore the historical power of imperial Russia. “His objective is not to bring the world to nuclear war,” Hare said.

#### Nuclear war impacts are overexaggerated – won’t cause extinction

Daley ’17 (Beth Daley – Editor and general manager of The Conversation. “The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn’t match reality.” The Conversation. 3/14/17. https://theconversation.com/the-understandable-fear-of-nuclear-weapons-doesnt-match-reality-73563)

Nuclear weapons are unambiguously the most destructive weapons on the planet. Pound for pound, they are the most lethal weapons ever created, capable of killing millions. Millions live in fear that these weapons will be used again, with all the potential consequences. However, the destructive power of these weapons has been vastly exaggerated, albeit for good reasons. Public fear of nuclear weapons being used in anger, whether by terrorists or nuclear-armed nations, has risen once again in recent years. This is in no small part thanks to the current political climate between states such as the US and Russia and the various nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. But whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it’s easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language. As the historian Spencer Weart once argued: “You say ‘nuclear bomb’ and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world.” Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex – and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, the chances that it would mean “the end of the world” are vanishingly small. In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that “if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone”. But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the Titan II missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state. That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes. Overdoing it Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation (or even several) would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, we’re still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times – a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto). While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty forced nuclear tests underground, around 500 of all the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth’s atmosphere. This includes the world’s largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as Tsar Bomba, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power – but as one physicist explained, it’s only “one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane”. The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonating. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called nuclear winter, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun’s rays for a considerable amount of time. To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, 2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US.

#### No nuclear war extinction – preempts all of their responses.

Brian Martin 82 [Australian National University, Canberra. “Critique of Nuclear Extinction.” ISSN 0022-3433, Journal of Peace and Research. No. 4, Vol. XIX, (1982). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002234338201900401]

The available evidence suggests that a major global nuclear war, one involving the explosion of most of the nuclear bombs that exist, would kill 400 to 450 million people, mostly in the US, Europe and Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China and Japan. Direct effects. Most of the deaths and injuries from a nuclear war would be due to blast and heat in the neighbourhood of each explosion and to exposure during the first few days to fallout deposited downwind of explosions at or near the surface of the earth.3 The number of people killed would be higher if population centres around the world were systematically bombed4 or if the cores of many nuclear power plants were dispersed. The number would be lower if substantial numbers of nuclear weapons were used on military targets or if more than minimal civil defence measures were used.

Indirect effects. (a) Global fallout. The main effect of long-term fallout would be to increase the rate of cancer and genetic defects by a small percentage. Tens of millions might be affected worldwide over a period of many decades, but this would provide no threat to the survival of the human species. 6

(b) Ozone. Nuclear war would cause an increase in ultraviolet light from the sun which reaches the earth’s surface, due to reductions in stratospheric ozone caused by its catalytic destruction by nitrogen oxides produced in nuclear explosions. This would increase the incidence of skin cancer (which is mostly non-lethal) and possibly alter agricultural productivity, but would be most unlikely to cause widespread death. 7

(c) Fires. Extensive fires caused directly or indirectly by nuclear explosions would fill the lower atmosphere in the northern hemisphere with so much particulate matter that the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface could be greatly reduced for a few months. If this occurred during the northern spring or summer, one consequence would be greatly reduced agricultural production and possible widescale starvation. 8

(d) Climatic changes. Such changes might be caused, for example, by injection of nitrogen oxides or particulate matter into the upper atmosphere. The more calamitous possibilities include a heating trend leading to melting of the polar ice caps, the converse possibility of a new ice age, and the changing of climatic patterns leading to drought or unstable weather in areas of current high agricultural productivity.9 The rate of impact of such climatic change is likely to be sufficiently slow - decades, or years in some cases - for the avoidance of the death of a substantial portion of the world’s population through climatic change.

(e) Agricultural or economic breakdown. A major possible source of widespread death could be the failure of agricultural or economic recovery in heavily bombed areas, followed by starvation or social breakdown. Agricultural failure could occur due to reduced sunlight due to fires or to induced changes in weather. An agricultural or economic collapse would also increase the likelihood of epidemics. If agricultural or economic breakdown followed by widespread starvation or epidemics occurred in heavily bombed areas, and no effective rescue operations were mounted by less damaged neighbouring areas, then it is conceivable that many tens or even several hundred million more people could die, mainly in the US, Soviet Union and Europe. 10

(f) Synergistic and unpredicted effects. The interaction of different effects, such as weakened resistance to disease due to high radiation exposure or to shortages of food, could well increase the death toll significantly. These consequences would mostly be confined to heavily bombed areas. Finally, there is the possibility of effects currently dismissed or not predicted leading to many more deaths from nuclear war. I I

To summarise the above points, a major global nuclear war in which population centres in the US, Soviet Union, Europe and China ware targeted, with no effective civil defence measures taken, could kill directly perhaps 400 to 450 million people. Induced effects, in particular starvation or epidemics following agricultural failure or economic breakdown, might add up to several hundred million deaths to the total, though this is most uncertain. Such an eventuality would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, but it is far from extinction. Even in the most extreme case there would remain alive some 4000 million people, about nine-tenths of the world’s population, most of them unaffected physically by the nuclear war. The following areas would be relatively unscathed, unless nuclear attacks were made in these regions: South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Oceania and large parts of China. Even in the mid-latitudes of the northern hemisphere where most of the nuclear weapons would be exploded, areas upwind of nuclear attacks would remain free of heavy radioactive contamination, such as Portugal, Ireland and British Columbia. Many people, perhaps especially in the peace movement, believe that global nuclear war will lead to the death of most or all of the world’s population. 12 z Yet the available scientific evidence provides no basis for this belief. Furthermore, there seem to be no convincing scientific arguments that nuclear war could cause human extinction.13 In particular, the idea of ’overkill’ if taken to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading. 14 In the absence of any positive evidence, statements that nuclear war will lead to the death of all or most people on earth should be considered exaggerations. In most cases the exaggeration is unintended, since people holding or stating a belief in nuclear extinction are quite sincere.1 5 Another major point to be made in relation to statements about nuclear war is that almost exclusive attention has been focussed on the ’worst case’ of a major global nuclear war, as indeed has been done in the previous paragraphs. A major global nuclear war is a possibility, but not the only one. In the case of ’limited’ nuclear war, anywhere from hundreds of people to many tens of millions of people might die. 16 This is a real possibility, but peace movement theory and practice have developed almost as if this possibility does not exist.

### AT EU Defense Integration

#### NATO is key – EU defense can’t replace it

Bergmann et al ‘ 21 (Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli. Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He has a master’s degree in comparative politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor’s degree in political science from Bates College. “The Case for EU Defense: A New Way Forward for Trans-Atlantic Security Relations.” CAP. 6/1/21. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/)

To be clear, EU defense will in no way replace or displace NATO. The NATO alliance is the most successful military alliance in history because it forged an unbreakable bond across the Atlantic, uniting the United States and Canada with Europe. Additionally, there are prominent European countries, such as Norway and the United Kingdom, that are not members of the EU. EU defense, therefore, could never replace NATO’s critical role. Instead, as this report argues, the EU could help strengthen the alliance by building a stronger European pillar, creating a more unified, efficient, and capable partner for the United States through NATO. A major shift is needed because the current problems plaguing European defense are structural. The problem with European defense is less about spending and more about fragmentation. Each European country has its own distinct national military, leading to incredible inefficiencies and waste. NATO does its best to coordinate the hodgepodge of European forces and plays a vital role in focusing on clear gaps in capabilities, setting priorities, establishing commitments, and coordinating forces. NATO’s role is crucial in stitching together 30 national military forces into a military alliance capable of acting together. But marginal spending increases dispersed among individual states does not provide nearly the benefit in security as it should. Strengthening European defense is therefore not just about spending but also about addressing the incessant fragmentation, duplication, and waste. Furthermore, Europe is transforming in ways that require NATO to adapt. In forming a political union, Europeans not only banded together, ceding significant sovereignty to the EU, but they also agreed to become EU citizens. Citizens of EU member states therefore became EU citizens as well, gaining common rights, privileges, and protections. As a result, this has blurred the perception of responsibility for defense and foreign policy between the EU in Brussels and the national capitals. But while present U.S. policy has blocked the EU from developing the hard-power tools to protect its EU citizens, there is consistent and overwhelming public support for greater EU involvement in defense. Yet there is no similar support for greater defense spending at the national level.

#### EU defense integration shouldn’t replace NATO – a mutual defense approach is best

Borrell ’22 (Josep Borrell. “Europe in danger: what next for EU security and defence?” - Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the Bibliothèque Solvay.” European Union. 1/25/22. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/%E2%80%9Ceurope-danger-what-next-eu-security-and-defence%E2%80%9D-speech-high-representativevice-president\_en)

Let me stress that NATO remains at the heart of Europe’s territorial defence. No one is questioning that. But this should not prevent European countries from developing their capabilities and conducting operations in our neighbourhood and beyond. Greater European strategic responsibility is the best way to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. It is not either EU or NATO: it is both/and. Let me also add that hesitations to move ahead on this agenda “because of NATO” come from inside the EU, not the US. They have repeatedly said, and I quote that the US wants: “a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes to global and Transatlantic security”. The US essentially says: “Don’t talk, act. Please get on with it and help us share the security burden.” Naturally, we must remain faithful to Europe’s way of doing security. We know that purely military responses are inadequate. We have seen this time and again, in Afghanistan, the Sahel and elsewhere. There are a lot of ‘lessons to learn’. One thing is clear: we need a comprehensive understanding of security and locally-owned political settlements. This is why the Compass puts a lot of emphasis on our ‘integrated’ approach, bringing civilian and military instruments together, investing in cooperative and multilateral solutions. That is our trademark and we must stick to wherever we operate around the world.

#### NATO effectively deters Russia now – Putin would have already used nukes

### AT Global Security

#### Conditional defense alliances (like NATO) prevent conflict initiation

Priebe et al ’21 (Miranda Priebe - Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University. Director, Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy; Senior Political Scientist. “ Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the U.S. in Conflict.” RAND Corporation. August 2021. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-3/RAND\_RRA739-3.pdf)

One set of studies asked whether states that join defensive alliances are more likely to initiate or escalate conflict than those with other security relationships (e.g., neutrality pacts, offensive alliances) or no alliances at all.35 All U.S. alliances are defensive in the sense that they commit the United States to provide military support only in the event of an attack on the ally. Multiple studies have found that, on average, states that have at least one defensive alliance are less likely to initiate conflict than states without a defense alliance.36 Once a dispute has begun, targeted states with a defensive alliance are less likely to respond with the threat, display, or use of force.37 In particular, defensive alliances with conditional terms have the strongest association with lower rates of conflict initiation.38 This suggests that the only type of alliance agreement that the United States has—the conditional defensive alliance—is associated with less conflict. Although these results do not definitively demonstrate that the written terms of alliances are what causes less conflict initiation, they do suggest that there is something common among states with conditional alliance relationships that induces less conflictual behavior. Other factors, however, such as a state’s ambitions, also influence the relationship between alliance commitments and conflict behavior. For example, there is little evidence that even defensive conditional alliances change the behavior of revisionist states—those with publicly stated ambitions for greater territory or status.39 Revisionist states with conditional defensive alliances still initiate conflict at higher rates than status quo states, and there is no statistically significant difference in the behavior of revisionist states with or without an alliance.40

### AT Ukraine/Russia War

#### Assistance from NATO is critical to Ukraine’s success in the conflict

NATO ’22 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.” 6/3/22. Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm#:~:text=4.,humanitarian%20and%20non%2Dlethal%20aid>.)

What are NATO and Allies doing to help Ukraine? NATO is helping to coordinate Ukraine’s requests for assistance and is supporting Allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. Individual NATO member countries are sending weapons, ammunition and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and anti-air systems, howitzers and drones. To date, NATO Allies have provided and committed billions of dollars of military equipment to Ukraine. All of this is making a difference on the battlefield every day, helping Ukraine to uphold its right of self-defence, which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, Allies are sending medical supplies and other vital equipment to Ukraine, including in such areas as cyber security and protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. They are also providing millions of euros of financial assistance to Ukraine. Many Allies are also providing humanitarian aid to civilians and hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees. Allies are also supporting efforts for international investigation of atrocities, including by providing legal expertise to Ukraine. NATO Allies have agreed to step up and sustain their support for as long as necessary, so that Ukraine can prevail.

#### NATO is key to prevent further escalation

NATO ’22 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.” 6/3/22. Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm#:~:text=4.,humanitarian%20and%20non%2Dlethal%20aid>.)

Why isn’t NATO sending troops or closing the skies over Ukraine? NATO’s actions are defensive, designed not to provoke conflict but to prevent conflict. The Alliance has a responsibility to ensure that this war does not escalate and spread beyond Ukraine, which would be even more devastating and dangerous. Enforcing a no-fly zone would bring NATO forces into direct conflict with Russia. This would significantly escalate the war and lead to more human suffering and destruction for all countries involved. What are NATO and Allies doing to impose costs on Russia? NATO Allies and partners have imposed unprecedented costs on Russia, including severe sanctions that are helping starve the Kremlin’s war machine of resources. Allies continue to refine the sanctions in order to increase the pressure on Moscow. These efforts will make it harder for Russia to rebuild its tanks, manufacture missiles and finance its war. These sanctions have been effective. The Russian economy is shrinking. Consumer prices have risen. Many Western companies have pulled out of Russia, and many Russian professionals have left. In a matter of weeks, President Putin has destroyed decades of economic progress for the Russian people. President Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine is a terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a heavy price, both economically and politically, for years to come.

#### NATO’s role in ending the conflict is indisputable

Merritt ’22 (Giles Merritt - Founder and Secretary General of Friends of Europe. He is also the Founder and Director of the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA). He is one of the most influential commentators in Brussels on EU issues. “Europe mustn't put all its eggs in the NATO security basket.” Friends of Europe. 5/24/22. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/europe-mustnt-put-all-its-eggs-in-the-nato-security-basket/)

The eyes of the West are on NATO and its swift response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But we should also focus our thinking on the European Union, for only the EU and not the US-led military alliance can be the basis of a peaceful long-term outcome to this crisis. So far, the EU’s political input has centred on sanctions to dissuade Russia from continuing its war against Ukraine. Henceforth, though, it must play a wider role. That was the message France’s President Emmanuel Macron strove to impart when he proposed a wider European political framework open to non-EU members such as Ukraine and the United Kingdom. NATO’s importance is indisputable. Although its ill-considered enlargement may very well have contributed to the crisis by feeding Russia’s ‘encirclement’ paranoia, the alliance now stands as the only credible deterrent of further incursions. However, US military strength can never be key to a lasting peace settlement in Europe. The US must back an eventual ceasefire leading to peace discussions between Kyiv and Moscow. But the greater burden of establishing a new European order capable of reassuring Russians while punishing Putin will fall on the EU’s shoulders. Washington’s financial and material support is crucial to Ukraine’s gallant counter-attacks, but it also rules out US leadership in whatever post-war reconciliation and re-balancing process may emerge.

#### NATO continues to strengthen its deterrence and defense posture in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict

NATO ’22 (“Deterrence and Defense.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3/28/22. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_133127.htm)

NATO is a political and military alliance, whose principal task is to ensure the protection of its citizens and to promote security and stability in the North Atlantic area. The Alliance must be able to address the full spectrum of current and future challenges and threats from any direction, simultaneously. The Alliance continues to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture in light of the changed and evolving security environment. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine poses the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades, shattering peace in Europe and reinforcing the need for NATO to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture is credible and effective. In response, NATO has activated its defence plans, deployed elements of the NATO Response Force and significantly increased the number of forces on its eastern flank. On 24 March 2022, at an extraordinary summit about Russia’s war on Ukraine, NATO leaders agreed to deploy four battalions in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in addition to the four already present in the Baltic States and Poland. More generally, they decided to take measures to ensure the security and defence of all Allies across all domains, reinforcing the Alliance’s longer-term deterrence and defence posture. NATO continues to face distinct threats and challenges emanating from all strategic directions; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber and hybrid attacks. Two military concepts set the direction for NATO’s ongoing evolution: the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area focuses on force employment to deter and defend today, while the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept offers a vision to guide the Alliance’s long-term warfare development to remain militarily strong now and in the future At the Brussels Summit in 2021, NATO leaders approved the “NATO 2030” initiative, which has led to the introduction of additional measures to ensure NATO remains strong militarily, becomes even stronger politically and adopts a more global approach to security. European Allies and Canada have made considerable progress in increasing defence spending and investing in major equipment, taking steps toward fairer burden-sharing within NATO: 2021 was their seventh consecutive year of increased defence spending, with a cumulative extra contribution of USD 190 billion since 2014.

## Other NATO Cards

### NATO = RC Russia-Ukraine Conflict

#### Putin’s decision to launch war on Ukraine stemmed from his fear of NATO expansion

Carpenter ’22 (Ted Carpenter - Carpenter received his PhD in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas. He is the senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. “The U.S. and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War. It’s Not ‘Siding With Putin’ to Admit It.” Cato Institute. 3/7/22. <https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-nato-helped-trigger-ukraine-war-its-not-siding-putin-admit-it>)

In his 2014 memoir, Duty, Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in both Bush’s administration and Barack Obama’s, conceded that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.” That initiative, he concluded, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.” Indeed it was, and Moscow began to push back. Putin exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐​Western government to launch a military offensive that penetrated deeply into the country. Upon its victory, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐​minded Georgian regions and put them under permanent Russian control. The Kremlin’s decisive action should have alerted even slow‐​learning U.S. leaders that the days of Russian officials merely issuing verbal protests about the West’s steady encroachment into Russia’s security sphere were over. Amazingly, though, the Obama administration still sought to turn Ukraine into a NATO political and military asset. In late 2013 and early 2014, the United States and several European governments meddled shamelessly to support the efforts of demonstrators to unseat Ukraine’s generally pro‐​Russia president, Victor Yanukovych, some two years before the expiration of his term. That campaign was especially inappropriate since Yanukovych became president in 2010 as the result of an election that even the European Union and other international observers acknowledged was reasonably free and fair. In a democratic system, the legal way to remove a president from office is, depending on a specific country’s constitutional rules, through a parliamentary vote of no‐​confidence, impeachment, or defeat in the next election. Angry street demonstrations do not fit into any of those categories, yet the United States and its allies backed that illegal process. A recording of the infamous leaked telephone call between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt confirmed the extent of Washington’s meddling in the affairs of a sovereign country. The Ukraine episode proved to be an intolerable provocation to neighboring Russia. Putin responded by annexing the strategic Crimea peninsula and the United States and its NATO partners then imposed economic sanctions on Russia. The new cold war was on in earnest. Yet Washington still refused to back off. Instead, the Trump and Biden administrations poured weapons into Ukraine, approved joint military exercises between U.S. and Ukrainian forces, and even prodded the allies to include Ukraine in NATO war games. In late 2021, it became clear that the Kremlin’s restraint had run dry. Moscow issued demands for security guarantees, including a draw‐​down of military forces already deployed in NATO’s eastern members. With respect to Ukraine, the demand was very clear and uncompromising: Not only would Kyiv never receive a membership invitation, but NATO weapons and troops would never be deployed on Ukrainian soil. When the West failed to provide those guarantees, Putin launched his devastating, full‐​scale war. Moscow’s cruel overreaction deserves emphatic condemnation. However, the culpability of the United States and its NATO allies also is sizable. Moving an alliance that one great power dominates to the border of another major power is inherently destabilizing and provocative. Those people who are familiar with even the basics of international relations should grasp that point; it was inexcusable that so many U.S. and NATO leaders apparently did not do so.

#### NATO is at root of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Bilefsky et al ‘ 22 (Dan Bilefsky, Richard Pérez-Peña and Eric Nagourney. Mr. Bilefsky studied history and literature at the University of Pennsylvania and received a master’s degree in European politics at Oxford University. “The Roots of the Ukraine War: How the Crisis Developed.” The New York Times. 4/21/22. <https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-europe.html>)

After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, NATO expanded eastward, eventually taking in most of the European nations that had been in the Communist sphere. The Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, once parts of the Soviet Union, joined NATO, as did Poland, Romania and others. As a result, NATO moved hundreds of miles closer to Moscow, directly bordering Russia. And in 2008, it stated that it planned — some day — to enroll Ukraine, though that is still seen as a far-off prospect. Mr. Putin has described the Soviet disintegration as one of the greatest catastrophes of the 20th century that robbed Russia of its rightful place among the world’s great powers. He has spent his 22 years in power rebuilding Russia’s military and reasserting its geopolitical clout. The Russian president calls NATO’s expansion menacing, and the prospect of Ukraine joining it a major threat. As Russia has grown more assertive and stronger militarily, his complaints about NATO have grown more strident. He has repeatedly invoked the specter of American ballistic missiles and combat forces in Ukraine, though U.S., Ukrainian and NATO officials insist there are none. Mr. Putin has also insisted that Ukraine is fundamentally parts of Russia, culturally and historically. East-West relations worsened drastically in early 2014, when mass protests in Ukraine forced out a president closely allied with Mr. Putin. Russia swiftly invaded and annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine. Moscow also fomented a separatist rebellion that took control of part of the Donbas region of Ukraine, in a war that still grinds on, having killed more than 13,000 people. Mr. Putin appears intent on winding back the clock more than 30 years, establishing a broad, Russian-dominated security zone resembling the power Moscow wielded in Soviet days. Now 69 years old and possibly edging toward the twilight of his political career, he clearly wants to draw Ukraine, a nation of 44 million people, back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia presented NATO and the United States in December with a set of written demands that it said were needed to ensure its security. Foremost among them are a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO, that NATO draw down its forces in the Eastern European countries that have already joined, and that the 2015 cease-fire in Ukraine be implemented — though Moscow and Kyiv disagree sharply on what that would mean. The West dismissed the main demands out of hand. Moscow’s aggressive posture has also inflamed Ukrainian nationalism, with citizen militias preparing for a drawn-out guerrilla campaign in the event of a Russian occupation. The Russian leader may also want to energize nationalists at home by focusing on an external threat, as he has in the past. Nevertheless, since the invasion began, thousands of Russians, some at great personal risk, have taken to the streets to protest the war. In early December, President Biden made clear that his administration was not considering sending troops to fight for Ukraine since, among other reasons, Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance and does not come under its commitment to collective defense. Instead, the United States has sent anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons to Ukraine, increased the American military presence in NATO countries bordering Russia, and ordered an additional 7,000 troops to Europe. The Pentagon also ordered the deployment of an armored brigade combat team to Germany to reassure skittish NATO allies in Eastern Europe. Administration officials also warned that the United States could throw its weight behind an Ukrainian insurgency.